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Summary 
 
Phenomenology is a critical component of autobiographical memory retrieval.  The 
phenomenology of a memory is what brings back to life a past experience (Sutin & Robins, 
2007; Tulving, 2002).  Some memories are vivid and rich in sensory details whereas others are 
faded; some memories are experienced as emotionally intense whereas others are not 
(Montebarocci, Luchetti, & Sutin, 2014).  Sutin and Robins (2007) identified 10 dimensions in 
which a memory may vary—i.e., Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Sensory Details, 
Emotional Intensity, Visual Perspective, Time Perspective, Sharing, Distancing, and Valence—
and developed a comprehensive psychometrically sound measure of memory phenomenology, 
the Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ).  Phenomenology has been linked to underlining 
stable dispositions—i.e. personality (Singer & Salovey, 1993), as well as to a variety of 
positive/negative psychological outcomes—well-being and life satisfaction, depression and 
anxiety, among others.  Beyond content, memory phenomenology reflects important aspects of 
psychological functioning that contribute to individuals’ sense of continuity over time (Prebble, 
Addis, & Tippett, 2013).  
Using the MEQ, the present thesis addresses several questions regarding: (1) age 
differences in memory affect and phenomenology across the adult lifespan (Study 1); (2) 
phenomenology and affect continuity across memory and over time (Study 2); (3) the 
interrelations between memory phenomenology, personality and positive/negative psychological 
outcomes (Study 1 and Study 2).  In particular, autobiographical memory phenomenology has 
been proposed as a dynamic expression of personality functioning that partially explains 
adaptive/maladaptive outcomes.   
The current thesis provides a brief overview of the principal models and theories on 
autobiographical memory (Introduction, Section 1) and the phenomenological component of 
autobiographical recollection (Introduction, Section 2).  Study 1 explored the subjective 
experience of two particular autobiographical memories—a Turning Point Memory and a 
Childhood Memory—in a large, stratified sample of American adults aged 20 to 90 years.   Study 
2 tested the same types of memories but applied a longitudinal design in a sample of young 
Italian adults.  Implications of the findings are discussed proposing future lines of research 
(General Discussion).  In particular, the need for more longitudinal studies is highlighted, along 
with the combined application of both self-report questionnaires and narrative measures.   
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Introduction 
1. What is Autobiographical Memory? A brief overview 
Autobiographical memory concerns the recollection of personally experienced past 
events (Brewer, 1986)—i.e., the first day of school, the birth of a child, wedding day, etc.   
It is worth distinguishing, however, between episodic memory and autobiographical 
memory (Fivush, 2011). Autobiographical memory is not simply the memory of what, when, and 
where an experience happened, but involves also what Tulving (2002) calls autonoetic 
consciousness: The conscious experience of self as having experienced the past.  
Autobiographical memory concerns events of personal significance, while episodic memory 
often refers to trivial events (e.g., a list of words retrieved in a laboratory setting).  
Autobiographical memory extends back over years and decades, while episodic memories 
usually last minutes or hours.  Lastly, while episodic memory refers to single events, 
autobiographical memory generally links past events into a personal story that relates the self 
through past, present and future (as reviewed by Fivush, 2011; see also Habermas & Bluck, 
2000; McAdam, 2001).   
Autobiographical memory is of fundamental significance because it defines our being 
and purpose in life, grounding the self in the experience (Conway, 2005).  As a consequence, it 
has been researched in many different areas of psychology, i.e. cognitive, social, developmental 
and clinical psychology (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  This session briefly review the 
principal models and findings of autobiographical memory research.   
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1.1 The Self-Memory System (SMS) and latter theorizations 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) developed an influential model of autobiographical 
memory, the Self-Memory System (SMS), which integrates many different areas of the 
psychological research on memory.  The authors defined autobiographical memories as 
“transitory dynamic mental constructions generated from an underlying knowledge base” 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, p. 261).   
In their early theorization, the SMS comprises an autobiographical knowledge base and a 
set of goal-driven control processes, referred as the working self.  The autobiographical 
knowledge base includes information at different levels of specificity: (1) lifetime periods, which 
consist of representations of prolonged periods of time (e.g., “early years of marriage”, “working 
at …”); (2) general events, which represent descriptions of repeated events (e.g. “driving to 
university every morning”) or single events (e.g., “my holiday in Florida”); and (3) event specific 
knowledge, which refers to more concrete sensory-perceptual-affective aspects of the events.  
The working self comprises of a hierarchy of goals, which drive cognition and behavior.  
According to the model, the active goals of the working self operate as a set of control processes 
that determine encoding, accessibility to autobiographical knowledge and the construction of 
specific memories (Conway, 2005).  A particular memory can be retrieved via two processes: 
generative retrieval (voluntary, top-down process) or direct retrieval (involuntary, bottom-up 
process).  When an internal or external cue spontaneously activates part of the autobiographical 
knowledge base then the working self delineates a ‘retrieval model’ that specifies memory 
recollection:  First some information is reported, and then new information is retrieved, in an 
iterative search-evaluate-elaborate cycle, that leads to the construction of a particular memory 
(Conway, 2005).  Control processes are needed to guide the search while inhibiting processing of 
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irrelevant information.  In contrast, direct retrieval occurs when a cue produces immediate 
activation of event-specific knowledge.  Because specific knowledge is typically linked to only 
one general event, and the general event is linked to only one lifetime period, a pattern of 
activation is quickly established.  Memories that are involuntarily recalled tend to be more 
specific and less frequently rehearsed than memories retrieved voluntarily.  In this case, control 
processes may intervene to prevent (inhibit) the disruptive effect of spontaneous retrieval on the 
ongoing activities.   
Later, Conway, Singer and Tagini (2004) proposed a modified version of the SMS that 
further clarifies the relation between autobiographical base knowledge and self (for reviews see 
also Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013; Singer & Conway, 2011).  The authors introduced a 
new component, the Long-term Self, which encompasses aspects of non-immediate knowledge of 
the self (see Figure 1). Most episodic memories (i.e., sensory-perceptual-affective 
representations) are rapidly lost but those related to current goals are retained for longer period 
of time and integrated with long-term autobiographical knowledge (Conway, 2005, 2009; 
Conway et al., 2004).  In the new model, the autobiographical knowledge base comprises not 
only general events and lifetime periods but also a more abstract, culturally determined level of 
information, the Life-story Schema.  The life-story schema refers to one’s life in entirety, for 
example “my career as a psychologist”, “my role as a spouse”, and so on (Bluck & Habermas, 
2000; Singer et al., 2013).  The other component of the long-term self is the Conceptual Self.  
The conceptual self consists of nontemporally specified conceptual self-structures, such as 
narrative scripts (Demorest, 1995; Tomkins, 1979), possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), 
internal working models (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973, 1980), attitudes, values, beliefs, and other 
semantic self-constructs.  Although this semantic knowledge of the self exists without grounding 
Autobiographical Memory  
6 
 
in specific autobiographical knowledge, it is in general linked with summary and/or specific 
memories (as reviewed in Singer et al., 2013).   
 
 
Figure 1: The Self-Memory System. Adapted from “The self and autobiographical 
memory: Correspondence and Coherence” by M. A. Conway, J. A. Singer, & A. Tagini, 
2004, Social Cognition, 22, p. 498. Copyright 2004 by Guilford Press. Reprinted with 
permission. 
 
 
Conway and colleagues (2004; Singer & Conway, 2011) highlight the fundamental 
tension between two competing demands in autobiographical memory: (1) to maintain adaptive 
correspondence––i.e. an accurate record of the ongoing activity––and (2) to ensure self-
coherence––i.e. a coherent and stable record of the self’s interaction with the world that extends 
beyond the present moment.  The flexibility of the SMS to answer each of these demands is 
considered the key toward psychological health and well-being (Singer et al., 2013; Singer & 
Conway, 2011). 
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1.1.1 Self-Defining Memories 
Singer and colleagues (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992; Singer & Salovey, 1993) identified 
a special class of autobiographical memories called self-defining memories that are particularly 
important for self-coherence.  These memories are highly relevant to the current self and are 
characterized by the following characteristics: They are (a) affectively intense, vivid and filled 
with sensory details, (b) repetitive and readily accessible, (c) intimately linked to other memories 
that share similar emotions and themes, and (d) relevant to the individual’s most important 
enduring concerns and conflicts (Singer & Salovey 1993).  As maintained by Conway and 
colleagues (2004), these memories are closely related to developmental goals (e.g., autonomy, 
achievement, growth, ageing, etc.) and become especially active when these goals undergo 
change.  For example, when the ongoing goal activity is frustrated or challenged by an obstacle, 
a self-defining memory will be retrieved, triggering a rapid response to situational demands.   
Self-defining memories have become the subject of a growing number of studies (e.g., 
Blagov & Singer, 2004; Jobson & O’Kearney, 2008; Lardi, D’Argembeau, Chanal, Ghisletta, & 
Van der Linden, 2010; Maccallum & Bryant, 2008; Sutherland & Bryant, 2005; Sutin, 2008; 
Sutin & Gillath, 2009; Sutin & Robins, 2005, 2010; Sutin & Stockdale, 2011; Thorne, McLean, 
& Lawrence, 2004; Wood & Conway, 2006). These memories represent a touchstone for self-
understanding and, thus, constitute significant material to work on during clinical interactions 
(Singer & Bonalume, 2010; Singer & Conway, 2011).  
Self-defining memories can be considered the building blocks of life story (as defined by 
McAdams, 2001; Singer et al., 2013). 
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1.1.2 The Life Story 
McAdams (1985, 2001) stated that the life story––the highest and most abstract level of 
autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005)––is identity.  Since the 1980s, McAdams has built an 
extensive research program on life story narratives.  He specifically identified and studied ‘key 
events’ composing personal life: from ‘childhood events’, to ‘turning’ life-changing experiences, 
to ‘high’ and ‘low’ points, to ‘life challenges’ and future expectations (McAdams, 2008).  In 
Western cultures, two dominant themes of relationship (communion) and autonomy (agency) 
characterize autobiographical memories and life stories (see e.g., Woike, Gersekovich, 
Piorkowski, & Polo, 1999).  Life stories can be also evaluated on the base of their emphasis on 
personal and social generativity (individual’s will to improve society and help future 
generations):  For example, individuals high in generativity tend to transform their personal 
stories from negative to positive (‘redemption narratives’; McAdams, 2006a), showing higher 
levels of well-being and personal growth (McAdams & De St. Aubin, 1992; McAdams, De St. 
Aubin, & Logan, 1993).   
The ability to construct coherent life narratives emerge in adolescence (Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000) and evolve through adulthood (McAdams & Olson, 2010; Reese et al., 2011).  
Habermas and Bluck (2000) suggest that when narrating their story, individuals establish a 
chronological sequence of events (temporal coherence), draw cause-and-effect relationships 
between events (causal coherence), and detect the presence of unifying themes across 
experiences (thematic coherence; e.g. “if you put your mind to it you can accomplish anything”).  
They also propose a cultural concept of biography, which includes landmark events (and their 
timing), such as normative transitions and life-cycle events (Habermas, 2007). 
M. Luchetti 
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Deficits in life story coherence may have unique links to psychological disorders (see 
McAdams, 2006b; Singer et al., 2013).  For example, researchers and clinicians have observed 
fragmented and disorganized narratives of traumatic experiences.  Incoherent accounts have been 
indeed associated with more psychological distress following trauma (e.g., Murray, Ehlers, & 
Mayou, 2002).  Still, the retrieval of less specific or vague memories has been implicated in the 
development and maintenance of depressive symptomatology (Sumner, 2012; Williams et al., 
2007 for reviews; see below for details).   
 
1.2 The lifespan retrieval curve 
The organization of autobiographical knowledge as proposed in the SMS is what has 
been called the microstructure of autobiographical memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Conway & Rubin, 1993).  Autobiographical memory also has a macrostructure, as appears in the 
lifespan retrieval curve (Conway, 2005; Conway & Rubin, 1993; Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & 
Haque, 2005).  When adults (about 35 years and older) are asked to retrieve autobiographical 
memories in free recall, they mostly recall memories from specific periods of their lives (e.g. 
early adulthood or recent years).  In particular, when plotting the memories according to age at 
encoding, three components emerge from the curve (see Figure 2): childhood amnesia (i.e., a 
lack of memories from birth to about five years of age), reminiscence bump (i.e., a larger 
numbers of memories from 10 to 30 years), and recency.   
These three components of the retrieval curve have been observed in many studies, and 
represent one of the most reliable phenomena of memory research (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; Conway & Rubin, 1993).  For example, in a recent study, Conway et al. (2005) studied 
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participants from China, UK, Bangladesh, and America and found clear evidence of childhood 
amnesia and reminiscence bump in all five countries.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The lifespan retrieval curve. 
 
Many theoretical explanations have been proposed for each of the three components: 
 Childhood Amnesia (see Wang, 2003 for a review) 
 The most famous account of childhood amnesia is provided by Freud (1915/1957), according 
to which threat-related thoughts and experiences of early years (e.g., sexual feeling to 
towards a parent) are repressed and consigned to the unconscious.  More recently, Howe and 
Courage (1997) highlighted the role of the ‘cognitive’ self:  Infants can form 
autobiographical knowledge only after the second years of age when they start distinguishing 
between ‘I’ and ‘Me’, having a sense of personal significance of the events.  Other accounts 
emphasize the role of language development and the emergence of narrative abilities (i.e., 
social-cultural-development theory; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).  In particular, the mother’s 
reminiscing style is considered an important factor:  Children whose mothers have an 
elaborative reminiscing style show greater ability to talk about past experiences (Harley & 
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Reesee, 1999).  As such, both social-cultural-linguistic and cognitive factors render 
memories after the childhood amnesia period accessible.   
 Reminiscence Bump (see Conway, 2005 for a review) 
 Rubin, Rahhal, and Poon (1998) argued that both novelty and stability explain the bump of 
events encoded in early adulthood.  Many memories of early adulthood refer to novel 
experiences (or first-time experiences) that are salient and hence memorable.  The high 
accessibility of memories from early adulthood (and from other life periods) may also be 
related to their stable relation with the self (Conway, 2005).  Perhaps, memories from the 
period of the reminiscence bump refer to self-defining experiences and thus serve to help 
maintain a coherent self over time.  Researchers have also suggested that the bump may be 
only present, or more prominent, for positive experiences (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003);  indeed, 
most of the life events that occur between 10 and 30 years refers to typical positive events 
such as falling in love, marriage and having children (Rubin, Berntsen, & Hutson, 2009; 
Scherman, 2013).  More recently, researchers point out that the temporal location of the 
bump may vary depending of the method used to elicit memories:  The mean age of the 
bump ranges from 8 to 22 years for word-cued memories, while it ranges from 15 to 27 years 
for important memories (Koppel & Berntsen, 2015).   
 Recency 
 Surprisingly, little research has been directed to this component of the curve. Given their link 
with the goals of the current self, Conway and colleagues (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Conway et al., 2004) view recent memories as more accessible than remote ones.  Rehearsal 
may be as well an important factor in the retention of recent everyday experiences.   
Autobiographical Memory  
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Interestingly, Conway and Holmes (2004) classified older adults’ memories on the basis 
of Erikson’s (1950, 1997) psychosocial stages.  The authors found that the contents of the 
memories corresponded to the psychosocial stage in which they were formed; for example, 
memories formed in early adulthood were coded as being associated identity/identity confusion 
and intimacy/isolation themes, while memories formed in middle-age were predominantly 
associated with generativity/stagnation and integrity/despair themes.  As such, it seems that 
memories of events that were once of great self-relevance remain highly accessible and are the 
first to bump in mind when a period in the past is freely sampled (Conway & Holmes, 2004).   
 
1.3 Autobiographical memory deficits in clinical disorders 
 Over the few last decades, a large number of studies focused on the relation between 
autobiographical memory deficits and emotional disorders.  For instance, when asked to retrieve 
a specific autobiographical memory in response to a cue word (e.g., “happy”), individuals with a 
diagnosis of major depression tend to be less specific and/or more overgeneral in their recall than 
non-diagnosed individuals (Sumner, 2012; Williams et al., 2007).  The so-called overgeneral 
autobiographical memory (OGM) phenomenon has been found to have a robust and replicable 
association with depression and trauma-related anxiety disorders (as reviewed in Sumner, 2012).  
OGM has been associated with deficits in problem solving (e.g. Gobbard, Dritschel, & Burton, 
1996, 1997) and difficulties in imagining future events (Williams et al., 1996).  Williams et al. 
(2007), and later Sumner (2012), proposed OGM as a vulnerability factor for depression and 
post-traumatic stress disorders; OGM have been found to longitudinally predict more severe 
symptoms (e.g., Boelen, Huntjens, & van den Hout, 2014; Kleim & Ehlers, 2008; Sumner, 
Mineka, & McAdams, 2013; Van Daele, Griffith, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2014) and a 
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worse course of depression and onset of subsequent episodes (e.g., Hermans et al., 2008; Kleim 
& Ehlers, 2008; see Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010).  The phenomenon also extends to other 
clinical disorders, such as bipolar disorder (e.g., Scott, Stanton, Garland & Ferrier, 2000), 
schizophrenia (e.g., Warren & Haslam, 2007), and borderline personality disorder (e.g., 
Kremers, Spinhoven, & Van der Does, 2004; Reid & Startup, 2010), as well as to specific 
population (e.g., subjects with physical illness; e.g., Kangas, Henry, & Bryant, 2005).   
Building on the SMS, Williams et al. (2007) developed a comprehensive model of factors 
that may contribute to the OGM phenomenon:  the CaR-FA-X. During generative retrieval, the 
search for specific information aborts prematurely, when only general descriptions have been 
accessed.  This abortion results from the combination of three mechanisms (see Sumner, 2012): 
(1) capture and rumination (CaR), which refers to when abstract self-relevant information 
activate ruminative processes “capturing” individual’s cognitive resources and disrupting the 
retrieval search (e.g., Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 2009);  (2) functional avoidance (FA), which 
refers to when the retrieval of specific memories is passively avoided to down-regulate negative 
emotions (e.g., Hermans, de Decker, et al., 2008);  (3) impaired executive control (X), which 
refers to when deficits on executive resources limit the ability to conduct a successful retrieval 
search (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007).   
Blagov and Singer (2004) found higher repressive defensiveness (as defined by 
Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson, 1979) to be associated with less specific recall.  As 
suggested by the authors, repression preempts any type of specific material—positive or 
negative.  Although this avoidance strategy may be useful in some circumstances, it becomes 
dysfunctional when develops into a habitual response pattern (see e.g., Williams, Eelen, Raes, 
Hermans, & 2006).  Although it reduces the immediate emotional impact of an event, it also 
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hinders the beneficial functions that memories serve.  The retrieval of vivid and detailed 
memories, indeed, supports individuals’ ongoing goal pursuits and future behavior (Blagov & 
Singer, 2004; Singer et al., 2013).   
According to Singer et al. (2013), the ability to summon specific memories should be also 
accompanied by the ability to draw meaning from past experiences.  In particular, Pasupathi and 
colleagues (e.g., Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006; Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007) 
highlighted the importance to link past experiences to long-term self knowledge to guarantee 
self-stability and explain self-change (as reviewed in Singer et al., 2013).  Drawing meanings 
from past experiences have been found to generally predict well-being and positive growth (e.g., 
Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005; Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; McAdams, Reynolds, 
Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001).  Singer and Conway (2011) argued that psychological health 
emerges from a flexible combination of the capacity to evoke specific memories with the 
capacity to connect such memories to conceptual structures of the self (Singer et al., 2013).   
 
1.4 Sampling autobiographical memories 
Many different methods have been applied to study autobiographical memory.  One of 
the main critical issues in the research field is ecological validity (i.e. applicability to real life).  
Ecological validity of memory research consists of two aspects: representativeness and 
generalisability (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004).  Representativeness refers to the extent to which a 
phenomenon can be investigated in a form and in a context that corresponds to its occurrence in 
everyday life, while generalizability refers to the degree to which the findings of a particular 
study (or set of studies) are applicable to the real world (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 2004).  Memories 
formed in a laboratory likely differ from memories retrieved in naturalistic context, for example 
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those memories that an individual shared with a friend during a conversation.  Nevertheless, 
research greatly advanced the understanding of basic processes of autobiographical memory.   
Methodological approaches have ranged from self-study in which researchers 
documented their own experience in a diary (e.g., Linton, 1975; Wagenaar, 1986), to cue word 
tasks (e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986; since Galton, 1879), to structured interviews (e.g., 
Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; McAdams, 2008).  One of the most diffuse methods, 
used to assess memory specificity, is the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986).  Typically, individuals are presented with negative/positive cue words and are 
asked to retrieve a specific memory for each cue within 30 seconds; the number of 
specific/general memories, as well as latency times, is used as units of the analyses. Several 
variations of the task are, however, present in literature (Griffith et al., 2012): Variations concern 
the number and type of cues used (e.g., the inclusion of neutral cue words), the modality of cue 
presentation (e.g., written vs. oral format), the type of instruction given to participants (e.g., 
detailed vs. non-detailed instructions). Other dimensions of memory beyond specificity (e.g., 
affective content) have been investigated using different memory tasks—examples are the Self-
Defining Memory Task (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992), McAdams’s (2008) Life Story Interview, 
and the Autobiographical Interview (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002).  
Participants are usually asked to recall a number of ‘key events’ or self-defining memories––
without any valence restriction, with the aim to sample their most personally relevant memories–
–i.e., memories that one may recall during an intimate conversation or in a therapeutic context.   
Singer and Bonalume (2010) recently proposed a Coding System for Autobiographical Memory 
Narratives in Psychotherapy, through which researchers may be able to extract self-defining 
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memories from psychotherapy protocols, and identify central themes and conflicts of client’s 
stories.   
Defining the key components, processes, and functions of autobiographical memory have 
important implications in clinical psychology.  Autobiographical memory offers a window into 
the individual’s personality functioning and can be a target of psychological interventions 
(Singer, 2004; Singer et al., 2013; Singer & Conway, 2011).   
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2. The phenomenological experiences of Autobiographical Memory  
Memory phenomenology is the conscious experience associated with retrieval of the 
memory.  The phenomenological perspective can be traced back to Wilhelm Wundt, the first 
experimental psychologist.  Wundt had people ‘introspect’, that is report on the subjective 
experience of a phenomenon. Since Wundt, there has been a long-lasting debate on introspection 
and phenomenology.  Freud highlighted the importance of stripping away the phenomenology to 
discover the unconscious meanings of early experiences.  Behaviorists, on the other hand, saw 
phenomenology as incompatible to the study of observable behaviors (as reviewed in Sutin & 
Robins, 2007).  Recent years have, however, observed a new interest in the conscious experience 
of personal memory (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 
2003; Sutin & Robins, 2007).   
According to Tulving (2002), phenomenology is what allows individuals to travel back in 
time and consciously relive their past.  The following extract is an example
1
: 
 
‘When I was 4 years old, my Grandmother and Grandfather came to visit us. It 
was a beautiful day and my grandparents wanted to take me and my sister for a 
walk on the beach to collect shells. […] Suddenly, the sky turned grey and the 
ocean started swelling. […] We start running as fast as we could to reach the car. 
But I was left behind. My Grandfather came back and holds me in his arms. […] I 
remember feeling absolutely loved.’ 
 
While recalling that day at the beach, the participant may re-experience the emotions felt 
at the time and see the scene as it is re-happening.  Beyond content, the subjective experiences of 
autobiographical memory may reflect important aspects of psychological functioning (Blagov & 
Singer, 2004; Singer & Salovey, 1993).   
                                                     
1
 An example of memory is drawn from Study 1; the memory account has been shortened and slightly 
modified to protect the participant's identity.  
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2.1 The identification of 10 phenomenological dimensions 
Based on an extensive review of the literature, Sutin and Robins (2007) identified 10 
relevant phenomenological dimensions:   
(1) Vividness 
Vividness is one of the most commonly assessed phenomenological characteristics of 
memories.  This dimension particularly refers to the ‘visual clarity’ of the memory (Sutin & 
Robins, 2007).  Remote memories tend to be less vivid than recent memories (e.g., Janssen, 
Rubin, & St. Jacques 2011; Montebarocci et al., 2014), though important and emotional 
events tend to remain vivid even after several years (e.g., Berntsen & Thomsen, 2005; 
Luchetti, Montebarocci, Rossi, Cutti, & Sutin, 2014).  For example, Talarico and Rubin 
(2007) tested longitudinally the phenomenology of memories of the September 11
th
 terrorist 
attack in a sample of undergraduates.  Compared to other everyday memories, these 
memories remained consistently higher in vividness over the 1 year follow-up.  Other studies 
on ‘flashbulb memories’ (i.e., memories of important public events; Brown & Kulik, 1977) 
have replicated this finding (e.g., Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman, Erskine, & Kornbrot, 
2010).  In general, emotionally intense memories tend to have rich visual details (e.g., 
Berntsen, 2001; Reisberg, Heuer, McLean, & O’Shaughnessy, 1988).  Vivid intrusive 
recollections are also what characterize many psychological disorders (Brewin, Gregory, 
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010).   
(2) Coherence 
Sutin and Robins (2007) defined coherence as “the extent to which the memory retrieved 
involves a logical story in a specific time and place rather than fragments of the original 
experience or a merging of many similar experiences” (p. 393).  As point out by the authors, 
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this dimension is somewhat similar to the dimension of ‘specificity’ described in Singer and 
colleagues’ work (Blagov & Singer, 2004).   
When recalling a memory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004), 
individuals typically move from general knowledge, i.e. lifetime periods and general events, 
to specific information, i.e. episodes situated in time and place (i.e., “my graduation party”).  
If an individual is not motivated, or does not have sufficient cognitive resources, he/she 
likely stops episodic retrieval.  As noted before, individuals suffering from depression tend to 
have limited access to specific event-knowledge information and tend to retrieve memories 
that are overgeneral (Sumner, 2012).  Such deficits have been associated with a worse course 
of depression (e.g., Hermans et al., 2008; Sumner et al., 2010) and onset of subsequent 
depressive episodes (e.g., Kleim & Ehlers, 2008).  Vague and incoherent memories may be 
functional to ‘avoid’ the emotional implication of an event, but, at the same time, 
incoherence may hinder the beneficial functions that memories serve (e.g., self-
understanding, directing behaviors).   
It is worth to note here that a large number of studies investigated memory coherence by 
coding memory narratives (e.g., Blagov & Singer, 2004; McLean, 2008; Reese et al., 2011), 
linking narrative coherence with positive psychological outcomes (e.g., well-being; Alea, 
McLean, & Vick, 2010; Baerger & McAdams, 1999).  Fewer studies have combined 
narrative analyses with self-report questionnaires to assess coherence (though see e.g., Rubin, 
2011; Sumner et al., 2013; Waters, Bohanek, Marin, & Fivush, 2013).   
(3) Accessibility 
Accessibility refers to the ease of retrieval of the memory.  The more a memory is relevant to 
the self, the more it will be accessible (Conway & Holmes, 2004; Conway & Pleydell-
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Pearce, 2000).  In a recent study (Rathbone & Moulin, 2014), memory accessibility was 
studied in relation to different levels of self-related knowledge.  Participants generated “I 
am” statements about themselves, which were used as cues in an autobiographical fluency 
task.  Statements that were generated first were associated with higher personal significance 
scores, and with the retrieval of a greater number of memories.  Accessibility has also been 
studied in relation to clinical variables.  For example, dysphoric individuals have been found 
to have less access to autobiographical material (e.g., Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Latorre et 
al., 2013).   
(4) Sensory Details 
Sensory Details refer to the sensory information that is re-experienced during retrieval.  
Along with visual details––which are considered separately in the Vividness dimension––
olfactory, auditory, tactile, and gustatory details enhance the subjective feeling of reliving the 
event in the memory.  This type of information has an important role in the construction of 
autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Cue modality, indeed, 
affects memory retrieval (Goddard, Pring, & Felmingham, 2005); for example, odour-cued 
memories tend to be older and less specific.  Moreover, the sensory component is stronger 
for real than for imagined events (McGinnis & Roberts, 1996; Suengas & Johnson, 1988).   
(5) Emotional Intensity 
For Sutin and Robins (2007) this dimension refers to the intensity of the emotions 
experienced both at the time of encoding and at the time of retrieval.  As evidenced by 
Talarico, LaBar and Rubin (2004), the intensity rather than the valence of the emotional 
experience better predicts autobiographical memory qualities (e.g. Vividness).  Walker and 
colleagues (Walker & Skowronski, 2009; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003) have 
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found, however, a differential fading in emotional intensity for positive vs. negative events, 
with negative events fading more than positive events over time.  Still, emotions associated 
with important life events fade less with time (Thomsen, Hammershøj Olesen, Schnieber, 
Jensen, & Tønnesvang, 2012).  Memories for stressful or traumatic events have also been 
found to be highly emotionally intense, especially in individuals with post-traumatic stress 
symptoms (Rubin, Boals, & Berntsen, 2008; Rubin, Dennis, & Beckham, 2011).   
(6) Visual Perspective 
Memories may be retrieved from a field perspective (i.e. first-person perspective) in which 
the individual sees the experience in the memory through his/her own eyes, or from an 
observer perspective (i.e. third-person perspective) in which the individual sees him or 
herself in the memory (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Siedlecki, 2015).  The interest in this 
dimension has recently grown (see Sutin & Robins, 2008a and Rice, 2010 for detailed 
reviews).  Recent memories tend to be recalled from a first-person perspective while remote 
memories, especially early childhood memories, are more likely retrieved from a third-
person perspective (Sutin & Robins, 2008a; e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2006).  First-person 
memories tend to be more vivid and emotionally intense (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Siedlecki, 
2015; Talarico et al., 2004) and rated higher on Coherence, Accessibility, Sensory Details, 
and Time Perspective (Sutin & Robins, 2010).   
Several studies have suggested that the adoption of an external point of view may serve to 
reduce the emotional impact of past events.  For example, when visual perspective is 
experimentally manipulated (see Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Robinson & Swanson, 1993; 
Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014), changing from first-person to third-person perspective 
significantly reduces memory-related emotions.  Individuals suffering from anxiety or 
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depressive symptoms are less likely to retrieve memories from a first-person perspective 
(Bergouignan et al., 2008; D'Argembeau, Van der Linden, d'Acremont, & Mayers, 2006; 
Lemogne et al., 2006).  However, though third-person perspective may serve to distance a 
traumatic experience from the self, ultimately it may maintain distress over time (Kenny & 
Bryant, 2007; Sutin & Robins, 2010).   
To date, the majority of studies have assessed memory perspective on unidimentional scales 
in which higher ratings correspond to first-person retrieval (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  More 
recently, however, Rice and Rubin (2009) proposed that field and observer perspectives are 
not ‘mutually exclusive’, but both perspectives can be experienced during the same retrieval 
attempt.  Though Rice and Rubin (2009) make a strong argument for field/observer 
‘independence’, further evidence are needed (though see Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014).   
(7) Time Perspective 
Time Perspective refers to the perceived clarity of when the experience in the memory took 
place, i.e. the ‘year’, ‘day’, ‘hour’.  Researchers suggest that participants’ are accurate in 
dating their autobiographical memories (Shum, 1998).  In the literature, temporal details have 
been evaluated both through analysis of content (e.g., Levine et al., 2002) and self-reported 
measures (e.g., Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014; Sutin & Robins, 2007).   
(8) Sharing 
A memory can be voluntarily recalled either personally or interpersonally (Fitzgerald & 
Broadbridge, 2013).  In particular, ‘talk about’ a past experience has shown to affect memory 
phenomenology, i.e. the amount of emotions and details recalled (e.g., Habermas & Berger, 
2011; Harris, Barnier, Sutton, & Keil, 2010; Pasupathi, 2003).  How a memory is retrieved 
also varies on the basis of the teller’s personal characteristics (age, gender, personality) and 
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the responsiveness of the listener (Alea & Bluck, 2003; Lorenzetti & Lugli, 2012). As 
highlighted by Alea and Bluck (2003) sharing a memory my serve to: (1) create and maintain 
intimate relationships, (2) teaching/informing others, and/or (3) eliciting and increasing 
empathy.   
(9) Distancing 
Distancing refers to the degree to which individuals psychologically distance themselves 
from the past self in the memory (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  In general, people tend to recall 
achievements and positive experiences as psychologically closer than failures and negative 
experiences (e.g., Demiray & Freund, 2015; Wilson & Ross, 2003 for a review).  In a recent 
study, Demiray and Janssen (2015) asked participants to report important events of their lives 
and rate them on a number of qualities, including psychological distance.  Psychological 
distance was associated with lower ratings of vividness and sense of reliving, emotional 
intensity, importance and rehearsal.  In particular, those with high levels of self-esteem felt 
closer to positive vs. negative memories, in part because they regarded their personal events 
as more important and rehearsed their memories more frequently.  As such, distancing may 
play an important role in determining positive psychological outcomes.   
Distancing may share some similarities with the concept of ‘closure’ (Beike & Wirth-
Beaumont, 2005), that is the degree to which a past experience feels resolved and 
understood.  Closed memories tend to elicit more positive (and less negative) emotions 
during recall (Crawley, 2010).  Moreover, the degree of closure seems to increase when 
reporting memory in written form, especially when the memory is repeatedly expressed from 
a third-person perspective (Crawley, 2010).   
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(10) Valence 
Valence refers to the degree to which the experience is perceived as positive or negative and 
includes the valence of the event and the valence of the emotional experience at the time of 
event (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  A positive bias has been noted in literature (e.g., Walker et 
al., 2003): Positive memories tend to outnumber negative memories.  Some studies have also 
shown that participants report more details for positive memories than for negative memories 
(D'Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2003; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2008), though others have not (Comblain, D'Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005).  For 
example, Waters et al. (2013) found no differences between memories for highly negative 
and positive events when retention interval and emotional intensity were controlled.  No 
significant differences were found between traumatic memories and control memories in 
recent studies (e.g., Rubin, 2011).   
Nevertheless, people seem to consider positive events more central to their life story and 
identity than negative events.  The centrality of positive events increases with time, whereas 
the centrality of negative ones decreases (Berntsen, Rubin, & Siegler, 2011).  However, 
individuals experiencing emotional distress tend to be more likely to consider traumatic or 
negative events as more central to their personal identity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2007; Berntsen 
et al., 2011).   
 
2.2 Measuring memory phenomenology 
Many studies have used ad hoc, single-item ratings to assess specific memory 
characteristics, though questionnaire measures have been also applied.  Single-items can be 
useful in some contexts, but multi-item measures are preferable when possible (Sutin & Robins, 
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2007).  Single questions do not always capture the complex nature of the underlying dimension 
being measured. Instead of asking to participants “How vivid is your memory?”, Vividness can 
be better assessed by asking different questions that cover different facets of the construct (e.g., 
the visual clarity of the image, the visual details of the people and the object in the memory, 
etc.).  Single-item measures also cannot control for individual differences in response style.  For 
example, some participants may rate all items as high, whereas others may be more conservative 
in their ratings.  Multi-item scales that include both positively and negatively keyed (i.e., reverse-
scored) items limit such response artifacts (as pointed out in Sutin & Robins, 2007).   
There are some questionnaire measures that have been used in memory research.  For 
example, Johnson et al. (1988) originally developed the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
(MCQ) to differentiate perceived vs. imagined events; specifically, the MCQ consists of 39 items 
measuring visual/sensory details, complexity, spatial and temporal information, and feelings.  
Later, Rubin et al. (2003) developed the Autobiographical Memories Questionnaire (AMQ), a 
measure that assesses belief/recollection as well as specific aspects of phenomenology.  The 
AMQ includes single-items referring to 19 memory ‘proprieties’: recollection (reliving, back in 
time) and belief (real/imagine, accurate, testify, persuade), component processes (see, setting, 
spatial, hear, talk, in words, story, emotions), reported proprieties of the events or the memories 
(importance, rehearsal, once/many, merged/extended, age of memory).  Despite their wide use, 
psychometric properties of these questionnaires have not been reported or formally tested.  
Johnson et al. (1988) and Rubin et al. (2003) did not provide an explicit definition of the 
measured constructs, or an explanation of how they got to their final set of items.  In fact, neither 
the MCQ nor AMQ cover the full range of phenomenological experiences that have been 
discussed in the literature (Sutin & Robins, 2007).   
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Only recently, researchers have attempted to provide a psychometrically sound 
assessment of phenomenology (Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2014; Luchetti & Sutin, 2015; Sutin & 
Robins, 2007).  Noteworthy is the work of Sutin and Robins (2007).  The authors developed the 
Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) to be a reliable and valid measure.  In particular, the 
MEQ covers some aspects of phenomenology (i.e. Visual perspective and Distancing) that were 
not assessed in earlier instruments.   
 
2.2.1 The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) 
The MEQ is a theoretically driven, psychometrically sound measure of phenomenology.  
It consists of 63-items, which includes 10 scales, assessing: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, 
Sensory Detail, Emotional Intensity, Visual Perspective, Time Perspective, Sharing, Distancing, 
and Valence (see above for the definition of the constructs).  The length of the scales varies 
depending on the breadth of the construct (median scale length = 6 item); the number of items 
ranges from 5 (Accessibility) to 8 (Coherence and Sensory Details).  The Coherence scale, for 
example, includes items that refer to the specificity of the information retrieved as well as to the 
coherence of the story in mind.  The Sensory Details scale also includes items referring to 
different facets of the domain–i.e. the presence of sounds, smells, tastes in the memory, as well 
as the reliving sensations associated with the memory.  Each scale has an approximately equal 
number of positively and negatively keyed items.  In a typical study, for each retrieved memory, 
participants indicate how much they agree with each of the items (e.g., “My memory for this 
event is dim”) on a 5-point response scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).  
High scores on a scale represent high levels of the variable being measured.  Appendix A lists 
the items of all 10 MEQ scales.   
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Using data from large independent samples (N = 941; N = 510; N = 212), Sutin and 
Robins (2007) tested the psychometric proprieties of the questionnaire for two types of 
memories: a general (recent) self-defining memory and an earliest (remote) childhood memory.  
All 10 scales showed high internal reliability (median alpha = .87; range = .72 to .97), and 
confirmatory factor analyses indicated that a 10-factor solution provided a good fit to the data.  
In particular, the authors found configural invariance between the general and the earliest 
memories, suggesting that the underlying structure of phenomenology is similar across different 
types of memories (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  Sutin and Robins also examined the 10 scales in 
relation to recency, affective content of the memories, and participants’ characteristics.  For 
example, positive affective content was associated with higher scores on Vividness, Sensory 
Detail, Visual Perspective, Time Perspective, Sharing, and Valence, whereas negative content 
was associated with higher scores on Emotional Intensity and Distancing.  Moreover, individuals 
with higher self-esteem rated their memories as more vivid, coherent, accessible, likely to be 
retrieved from the first-person perspective, and positively valenced.  Since Sutin and Robin’s 
work, the full-questionnaire or its individual scales have been used in several studies, with 
student samples (e.g., Sutin & Robins, 2010; Sutin & Stockdale, 2011), community samples 
(e.g., Newby & Moulds, 2011a) and clinical populations (Newby & Moulds, 2011b; Werner-
Seidler & Moulds, 2011).  An Italian version of the MEQ is also available, and it has been 
applied in two studies with clinical and non-clinical participants (Luchetti et al., 2014; 
Montebarocci et al., 2014).   
Luchetti and Sutin (2015) recently developed a short form of the MEQ, more easily 
applicable, which preserves the psychometric proprieties of the original scale (referred 
hereinafter as to MEQ-SF).  In their study, participants (N = 719; N = 352) retrieved and rated 
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different types of autobiographical memories—i.e. a general self-defining memory and an early 
childhood memory (Sample 1), a general self-defining memory, and either a positive or a 
negative academic memory (Sample 2)—and completed measures of psychological distress (i.e. 
depression, anxiety, and loneliness).  On the basis of item content/wording and item-total 
correlations, the authors reduced the original MEQ scales to approximately one-half of the 
items2.  Despite being much shorter, each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency 
(see Table 1 for details) and was highly correlated with the corresponding long-form scale 
(median r = .95).  Similar to the full-length scales, the alpha reliabilities for Coherence and 
Sensory Details were lower than for the other MEQ scales because of the breadth of these 
constructs.  The authors also examined the associations between the short/long MEQ scales and 
psychological distress.  Of note, the short- and long-forms had largely similar associations with 
the measured variables.  In general, participants with higher psychological distress tended to 
retrieve their memories as less vivid, more incoherent and inaccessible, less temporally clear and 
more psychologically distant, and from an observer perspective.  Such a short form can be useful 
for several reasons.  First, it takes less time to administer, which is critical when time is limited 
and/or when multiple memories are collected.  Second, a shorter, more readable version of the 
MEQ can be more easily applied in specific populations (e.g., older adults, psychiatric patients).  
Finally, the MEQ-SF allows the assessment of all 10 phenomenological dimensions without 
having to rely on single-items or having to choose between the scales.   
 
 
                                                     
2
 Since the original scales had good internal consistency, there was strong evidence that each of the items 
was a good marker of its respective construct. As such, the items of the short scales were selected to 
maximize the coverage of the domain content (Luchetti & Sutin, 2015). Of note, the authors did not 
choose the items that would yield the highest internal consistency because that would have led to 
redundant content that did not adequately sample from around the domain. 
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It is worth noting that the 10 MEQ scales are moderately interrelated (Montebarocci et 
al., 2014; Sutin & Robins, 2007), and thus they might not measure distinct constructs.  Sutin and 
Robins (2007), however, recommended maintaining the scales separated.  Even the three scales 
with the highest intercorrelations (i.e., Vividness, Coherence, and Accessibility) had distinct 
correlates. As such, collapsing these scales into a single superordinate scale can obscure 
theoretically important relations (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  
Autobiographical Memory  
30 
 
Table 1 – Long vs. short forms of the MEQ scales 
Note. This table refer to data reported in Luchetti and Sutin (2015). The median alpha of each scale was calculated 
across memories of Sample 1 (N = 719) and Sample 2 (N = 352). Participants of Sample 1 retrieved a general self-
defining memory and a childhood memory; participants of Sample 2 retrieved a general self-defining memory, and 
either a positive academic or negative memory.  
  
 
MEQ scales 
No. of items 
Internal Consistency 
(median alpha) Content of the short form 
Long Short Long Short 
Vividness 
↑ visually clear 
6 (3R) 3 (1R) 0.87 0.74 e.g., “My memory for this event is very vivid”. 
Words as “vivid”, “detailed”, and “dim” were 
preferred to “clear”, “vague”, and “sketchy”. 
Coherence 
↑ logical and coherent 
8 (4R) 4 (2R) 0.81 0.67 e.g., “This memory comes back to me in bits 
and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story”. 
Items that refer to memory specificity were 
maintained, i.e. events “occurred once at a 
particular time and place”. 
Accessibility 
↑ easily accessible 
5 (3R) 3 (2R) 0.86 0.81 e.g., “This memory was easy for me to recall”. 
Colloquial expressions such “sprang to my 
mind” or “memory bank” were avoided 
because difficult to translate into other 
languages. 
Sensory Details 
↑ rich sensory details 
8 (4R) 4 (2R) 0.73 0.51 e.g., “As I remember the event, I can hear it in 
my mind”. Items that referred to emotional 
feelings were excluded to avoid content 
overlap with Emotional Intensity. 
Emotional Intensity 
↑emotionally intense 
6 (3R) 3 (1R) 0.86 0.83 e.g., “The memory of this event evokes 
powerful emotions”. Items with redundant 
wording were removed. 
Visual Perspective 
↑first-person perspective 
6 (3R) 3 (2R) 0.89 0.85 e.g., “I view this memory as if I was an 
observer to the experience”. Items with 
redundant wording were removed. 
Time Perspective 
↑clear time perspective 
6 (3R) 3 (1R) 0.85 0.81 e.g., “My memory for the year when the event 
took place is vague”. Each item refers, 
respectively, to the “year”, “day”, and “hour” 
in which the experience took place. 
Sharing 
↑ often shared 
6 (3R) 3 (1R) 0.89 0.87 e.g., “I have talked about this event many 
times”. Items refer to the frequency of ‘talking 
about’ the event. 
Distancing 
↑ psychologically distant 
6 (3R) 3 (1R) 0.86 0.86 e.g., “When I recall this memory, I think, 
‘‘that’s not me anymore”. Items refer to the 
perceived distance of past self. 
Valence 
↑ positive valenced 
6 (3R) 2 (1R) - - e.g., “The overall tone of the memory is 
positive/negative”. The items referring to the 
general emotional tone of the memory. 
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2.3 Phenomenology across adulthood 
A large body of research on aging and memory has demonstrated that older adults are 
generally deficient in retrieving episodic memories but maintain the capacity to generate self-
semantic knowledge (e.g., Ford, Rubin, Giovanello, 2014; Levine et al., 2002; Piolino, 
Desgranges, Benali, & Eustache, 2002; Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2009; Ros, Latorre, & 
Serrano, 2009; St. Jacques & Levine, 2007).  For example, Piolino al. (2006) explored 
differences in autobiographical memory among young (21-34 years), old (60-69 years) and very 
old (60-69 years) adults, and found an age-related decrease in memory specificity.  Memories of 
old/very old participants, compared to young participants, had general events that lacked 
spatiotemporal details.  Older adults also tended to report less autonoetic recollection and more 
observer perspective in their autobiographical memories than young adults.  Piolino et al. (2010) 
later replicated these findings, linking deficits in specificity of old participants to deficits in 
executive function/working memory.  Such deficits in the elderly are particularly important as 
they have been linked to impoverished capacity to imagine or pre-experience the future (Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2008), higher depression (Ramirez, Ortega, Chamorro, & Colmenero, 2014) 
and lower well-being (Latorre et al., 2013; Ramirez et al., 2014).   
Based on findings cited above, one would expect younger participants to report higher 
ratings of phenomenology (e.g., Vividness) than older participants.  In fact, this is not always the 
case (e.g., Janssen et al., 2011; Kingo, Berntsen, & Krøjgaard, 2013; Rubin & Berntsen, 2009; 
Rubin & Schulkind, 1997).  For instance, Rubin and Schulkind (1997) found that older adults 
(over 70 years) reported higher ratings of vividness compared to young adults, for both important 
and word-cued memories.  Similarly, Rubin and Berntsen (2009) had participants (N = 2,000; 
age range = 15–90) recall memories of recent vs. remote important events, and found age to be 
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positively correlated with most of the AMQ rating scales.  Perhaps, independently of the 
recency, older adults do possess some phenomenological-rich memories.  Singer, Rexhaj, and 
Baddeley (2007) indeed observed that, despite the tendency to report more general memories, 
older adults’ capacity for retaining well-rehearsed, vivid, and thematically critical memories—
i.e. self-defining memories—from across the lifespan remains intact.  In a recent study 
(Martinelli, Anssens, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013), for example, older adults did not differ in self-
defining memories from young adults, but did differ from patients with Alzheimer dementia.  
The preservation of such memories in healthy subjects provides “a personal, psychological, 
history of changes to the self” (Conway & Holmes, 2004, p. 462), thereby “ensuring a sense of 
identity and continuity” across the lifespan (Piolino et al., 2006, p. 522).   
Of note, the majority of the existing works have compared small groups of young and old 
adults (e.g., Ford et al., 2014; Piolino et al., 2010; Piolino et al., 2006; Singer et al., 2007).  
Fewer studies have been based on large, stratified samples representing the entire adult life span 
(though see Kingo et al., 2013).   Moreover, most studies focused on the specificity/coherence 
dimension, neglecting other important phenomenological components (e.g., Distancing).  Given 
the potential implications of memory phenomenology at older ages, further studies need to 
clarify the lifespan trends of autobiographical remembering (Habermas, Diel, & Welzer, 2013).   
 
2.4 Phenomenology over time 
As noted by Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2004), the subjective experience of a 
memory is not idiosyncratic to the event in the memory; stable individual differences likely 
contribute to phenomenology continuity across memories and over time (see also Sutin & 
Robins, 2005).   Rubin et al. (2004) tested stability in phenomenology ratings by asking 
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participants (N = 30 students) to recall the same 20 autobiographical memories at two sessions 
separated by two weeks.  Beyond the moderate stability of each individual memory (correlation 
within-subjects ~ .50), the authors found a general tendency for participants to report 
phenomenologically-rich (vs. poor) memories at both sessions (correlations between-subjects 
~.80), which were thought to reflect stable individual differences in cognitive (retrieval) style.  
The question of continuity is of special significance.  Some phenomenological dimensions (e.g., 
vividness, specificity/coherence, emotional intensity) may play a critical role in developing and 
maintaining psychological distress (e.g., Boelen et al., 2014; Sumner et al., 2013).   
To date, however, relatively few studies have assessed autobiographical memory 
longitudinally.  Of note, most of the studies focused on the consistency or the accuracy of the 
content rather than on the continuity of the subjective experience of affect and phenomenology.  
One exception is the study of flashbulb memories, for which the question of 
consistency/continuity has been of substantial interest (e.g., Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich & 
Kershawz, 2009; Curci & Luminet, 2006; Koppel, Brown, Stone, Coman, & Hirst, 2013; 
Kvavilashvili et al., 2010; Talarico & Rubin, 2007).  Fewer empirical reports have addressed the 
question for other types of memories (though Bauer, Tasdemir-Ozdes, & Larkina, 2014; 
McAdams et al., 2006; Thorne, Cutting, & Skaw, 1998).  In a recent diary study, Thomsen et al. 
(2012) compared ‘life-story memories’ recalled by participants from the diary period (5-months), 
with ‘control memories’ randomly selected by experimenters.  Results showed that life-story 
memories not only maintained, but slightly increased, their levels of pleasantness, emotional 
intensity, goal relevance and importance over time, whereas the level of these characteristics 
dropped for control memories at the 3-month follow-up.  Other researchers have also observed 
nontrivial levels of continuity in the emotional tone and the motivational themes (e.g., personal 
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power, achievement) of self-relevant memories, independently of the consistency of their content 
(McAdams et al., 2006; Sutin & Robins, 2005).  However, the question of continuity still 
remains understudied.  For example, further studies are needed to test whether continuity varies 
as a function of participants’ characteristics (e.g., personality).   
 
2.5 Phenomenology and personality 
Recently, several studies have examined the link between autobiographical memory 
phenomenology and personality using the Five-Factor Model of personality (e.g., Rasmussen & 
Berntsen, 2010; Rubin et al., 2008; Rubin & Siegler, 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2010), otherwise 
known as the “Big Five” (John & Srivastava, 1999; McCrae & Costa, 1999).  The model 
addresses personality in terms of five broad domains:  Neuroticism (the tendency to feel 
insecure, easily upset, and emotionally unstable), Extraversion (an inclination toward being 
talkative, assertive, and energetic), Openness (the tendency to be imaginative, creative, and 
independent-minded), Agreeableness (a disposition toward being altruistic and cooperative) and 
Conscientiousness (the tendency to be organized, reliable and persistent, and strong-willed).  The 
motivational and emotional processes associated with these traits likely shape memory retrieval.  
Rubin and Siegel (2004), for example, found that Openness and Extraversion were related to the 
reliving qualities of participants’ memories (e.g., sensory imagery).  Similarly, using the AMQ 
(Rubin et al., 2003), Rasmussen and Berntsen (2010) reported significant correlations of 
Openness (p < .01) with ‘physical reaction’ (Study 1), ‘vividness’, ‘coherence’ and ‘reliving’ 
AMQ variables (Study 2).  They also observed significant associations between Neuroticism and 
‘valence’, and between Extraversion and ‘conversational rehearsal’ (but only in Study 1).  Other 
studies, instead, found support for an association between Neuroticism and Conscientiousness 
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and memory phenomenology (Rubin et al., 2008; Sutin, 2008)—i.e.  Neuroticism was linked to 
the retrieval of emotionally intense memories and to distance the self from such memories, while 
Conscientiousness was linked to having vivid and coherent memories (Sutin, 2008).  While 
Neuroticism (Harm Avoidance) has been associated with the retrieval of positive memories from 
a third-person perspective (Lemogne et al., 2009), Conscientiousness has been related to a 
general tendency toward first-person retrieval (Sutin & Robins, 2010). These traits have also 
been associated with the construction of negative vs. positive life stories (e.g., Thomsen, 
Hammershøj Olesen, Schnieber & Tønnesvang, 2014).  Of note, the methodological differences 
across studies, such as the sample size and composition (e.g., the inclusion of participants with 
high vs. low levels of post-traumatic stress symptoms; Rubin et al., 2008) and the type of 
memory assessed (i.e., word-cued vs. self-defining memories), likely account for some 
inconsistencies in results.   
Building on McCrae and Costa’s (1999) conceptualization of personality, Sutin (2008; 
see also Sutin & Robins, 2008b) proposed autobiographical memory as one of the mechanisms 
that mediates basic tendencies (i.e. personality traits) and characteristics adaptations (i.e., 
strivings, attitudes, and so on).  From the perspective of Five-Factor theory (McCrae & Costa, 
1999), characteristic adaptations emerge from the interactions of underlying traits and external 
influences; the connections between these components are called dynamic processes (i.e., 
cognitive–affective processes)3.  Neuroticism and Conscientiousness, in particular, appear as 
                                                     
3
 It is worth noting that McCrae and Costa’s theorization share some similarities with McAdams’s (2001; 
McAdams & Pals, 2006) model of personality. McAdams (2001) stated that “personality is a complex 
patterning of traits, adaptations and stories” (p. 112). In his theorization, dispositional traits (Level 1), 
characteristic adaptations (Level 2) and life stories (Level 3) are equally important levels of personality. 
McAdams’s Level 1 of personality mainly corresponds to McCrea and Costa’s basic tendencies––
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness.  By contrast, characteristic 
adaptations (Level 2 of personality) are conceived differently in the two models. For McAdams, 
characteristic adaptations  consist of personal action constructs and self-regulatory processes, while, for 
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critical determinants of individuals’ characteristics adaptations in the literature.  These traits have 
been linked to numerous positive/negative psychological outcomes (Friedman & Kern, 2014)––
e.g., depression (e.g., Weiss et al., 2009; see also Klein, Kotov, & Bufferd, 2011), well-being and 
life satisfaction (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008), among others.  
Given that personality influences the construction of memory and that memory influences 
outcomes also influenced with personality, phenomenology should mediate the relation between 
these constructs (Sutin, 2008).  In other words, phenomenology can be considered one of the 
dynamic processes that translate basic tendencies into characteristic adaptations.  For example, 
an individual high in Neuroticism may evaluate his/her current life satisfaction based on the 
subjective experience of his/her most meaningful memories.  If those memories are saturated 
with negative emotions, he/she likely uses that information to determine whether or not he/she 
feels satisfied with life.  Sutin’s (2008) results supported the mediating role of content and 
memory phenomenology.  For example, in Study 1 (N = 162), individuals high in Neuroticism 
reported more somatic complains, in part, because their self-defining memories were saturated 
with negative affective content and were more emotionally intense.  These individuals also 
tended to distance from their memories and thus had less life satisfaction.  In Study 2 (N = 345), 
positive content, vividness, and coherence partially mediated the relation between 
Conscientiousness, achievement goals and study skills.  Though causal link cannot be drawn, the 
approach adopted by Sutin has represented an interesting way to study memory and personality.    
                                                                                                                                                                           
McCrae and Costa, consist of acquired psychological attributes––i.e., personal strivings, interests, skills, 
and so on (McCrae, 2003). Although McCrae and Costa specify that dynamic processes are the 
mechanisms through which basic tendencies are expressed as characteristic adaptations, they only allude 
to what those processes may be (Sutin, 2008; e.g., selective attention, social comparison, etc.). McCrae 
and Costa also distinguished basic tendencies and characteristic adaptations from the self-concept, which 
includes life stories but also other information about the self. 
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In fact, memories and personality likely reciprocally influence each other.  Memories 
may be one mechanism underlying personality change over long time periods (Sutin & Robins, 
2005).  For example, how individuals experience and interpret stressful life events likely affect 
changes in personality across adulthood (e.g., Sutin, Costa, Wethington, & Eaton, 2010), 
determining in turn adaptive/maladaptive psychological outcomes.   
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The current research  
As previously described, phenomenology is a key aspect of autobiographical memory. 
Memory phenomenology has been linked to underlining stable dispositions (Singer & Salovey, 
1993), as well as to a variety of positive/negative psychological outcomes. Using the Memory 
Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ), the present research tested the full-range of 
phenomenological experiences of personally meaningful memories. It is worth to make a 
distinction between memories formed in laboratory setting versus memories retrieved in 
naturalistic context. Several memories are episodic, but only few are truly autobiographical. The 
present research focused on memories that individuals deem particularly important, those that are 
most likely retrieved in times of need. In other words, the building blocks of individuals’ life 
stories.  
A cross-sectional and a longitudinal study were conducted on samples of American and 
Italian adults. Specifically, the research aimed to examine:   
(1) age differences in memory affect and phenomenology (Study 1);  
(2) continuity of subjective experiences across memories and over time (Study 2); 
(3) how phenomenology contributes to positive and negative psychological outcomes and 
whether phenomenology mediates the association between personality and these 
outcomes (Study 1 and Study 2). 
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Study 1: Autobiographical Memory across the adult lifespan 
Autobiographical memories are a touchstone for individuals’ self-understanding 
(Conway, 2005; Singer & Salovey, 1993) and their experience of continuity over time (Prebble 
et al., 2013).  For example, vivid memories often serve as reminders of lessons learned and help 
to maintain goal engagement (Blagov & Singer, 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2007).  The retrieval of 
specific memories may contribute to more effective problem-solving in problematic situation 
(e.g., Beaman, Pushkar, Etezadi, Bye, & Conway, 2007; Williams et al., 2006), and likewise 
determine the capacity to imagining and planning forward in time (e.g., Addis et al., 2008).  As 
adults pass through different developmental stages, differences in memory may emerge.  
Detailed-rich recollection of personal past has been linked to an overall sense of well-being at 
older ages (e.g., Latorre et al., 2013; Ramírez et al., 2014), while impoverished memories have 
been associated with increased depression and state anxiety (e.g., Ramírez et al., 2014).  As such, 
it is important to outline how autobiographical memory changes across adulthood and how it 
contributes to adaptive/maladaptive psychological outcomes.   
Applying a cross-sectional design, Study 1 explored the affective and phenomenological 
experience of two particular autobiographical memories—a Turning Point Memory and a 
Childhood Memory—in a large, stratified sample of American adults aged from 20 to 90 years.  
The study aimed to address the following questions: 
 Are there age differences in memory affect and phenomenology across the adult lifespan? 
Age differences in autobiographical memory are most often examined between younger 
and older adult samples.  In general, older adults tend to report fewer episodic details but 
more semantic information during memory retrieval than younger adults (e.g., Ford et al., 
2014; Piolino et al., 2002; Piolino et al., 2006; St. Jacques & Levine, 2007) and a more 
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positive view of past events (e.g., Schryer & Ross, 2012; Singer et al., 2007).  Fewer 
studies have been based on stratified samples representing the entire adult life span (e.g., 
Kingo et al., 2013).  This latter approach allows exploring different aspects of memory 
across age, detecting both linear and nonlinear trends age differences across adulthood.  
On the basis of the literature, it can be hypothesized that phenomenological dimensions 
like Coherence will increase between early and middle-adulthood, remain stable and 
slightly decrease after 60 years of age.  There is, however, less evidence about trends for 
other phenomenological dimensions (e.g. Distancing).   
 Is the association between personality and psychological outcomes mediated by 
autobiographical memory? 
Memory qualities, like specificity/coherence, have been associated with relevant clinical 
constructs across ages.  For instance, in previous studies, those who report less coherent 
personal memories have shown higher levels of depression and lower life satisfaction 
(Baerger & McAdams, 1999; see also Latorre et al., 2013; Waters & Fivush, 2014).  Still, 
stable individual differences in personality functioning (e.g. Neuroticism and 
Conscientiousness) have found to be associated with memory phenomenology (see 
above; e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Rubin & Siegler, 2004).  Individuals high in 
Neuroticism—who are inclined to experience a wide range of negative emotions—may 
report more emotionally negative memories, while individual high in 
Conscientiousness—who are inclined to be organized and disciplined—may retrieve 
more detailed and vivid memories.  These traits, in particular, have been linked to 
numerous psychological health outcomes (e.g., depression; for a review Friedman & 
Kern, 2014).   
M. Luchetti 
41 
 
Given that personality is associated with the reconstruction of memory and that memory 
is associated with outcomes also associated with personality, affect and phenomenology 
have been proposed to mediate the relation between these constructs.  Expanding 
previous works (Sutin, 2008), the present study explores whether memory mediates the 
relation between Neuroticism and Conscientiousness and positive/negative psychological 
outcomes: depressive symptoms, overall well-being and life satisfaction (see Figure 1 for 
the conceptual path model).   
It is expected that because these traits have been linked with risk of depression (Weiss et 
al., 2009), and because depression has been linked with impoverished memory (e.g., 
Söderlund, Moscovitch, Kumar, & Daskalakis, 2014) and greater emotional reactivity to 
life events (e.g., Bylsma, Taylor-Clift, & Rottenberg, 2011), dimensions like coherence 
and emotional intensity will partially mediate the personality-depression association.  
Specifically, individuals high in Neuroticism are likely to experience more depressive 
symptoms because their memories are less coherent, but more emotionally intense, and 
saturated with negative affect.  By contrast, individuals high in Conscientiousness are 
likely to experience fewer depressive symptoms because their memories are more vivid, 
coherent, and saturated with positive affect.  On the other end, given that low 
Neuroticism and high Conscientiousness have been linked with overall well-being and 
life satisfaction (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel et al., 2008), and that autobiographical 
memory has been related to such outcomes as well (e.g., Latorre et al., 2013; Sutin, 2008; 
Waters & Fivush, 2014), affect and phenomenology are also proposed as possible 
mediators of the personality-well-being association.  Specifically, individuals low in 
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Neuroticism and high in Conscientiousness are likely to show higher levels of well-being 
because they have more vivid, coherent, and less psychologically distant memories.   
 
 
Figure 1: Path model of the mediation of the effect of personality on positive and negative psychological 
outcomes through memory affect and phenomenology.  
 
 
 
Autobiographical memory can be considered as a dynamic expression of personality 
functioning that partially explains adaptive/maladaptive psychological outcomes (Sutin, 
2008; see McCrea & Costa, 1999).  Though causal links cannot be drawn, this approach 
potentially clarifies the mechanisms behind long-term positive/negative adaptations.   
 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
The current study utilized an on-line survey created with Qualtrics software 
(www.qualtrics.com).  The survey link was distributed by Survey Sampling International (SSI; 
www.surveysampling.com), a sampling company that provided an Internet sample of different 
age groups from the United States, balanced equally by gender and race/ethnicity.   
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Participants were asked to complete a memory task (Block 1)––i.e. a Turning Point and a 
Childhood Memory (see below for details)––and a series of self-report questionnaires (Block 2).  
A total of 1,075 respondents completed at least part of the survey (age M = 45.6 [SD = 15.1], 
range = 20-87; education [years], M = 14.8 [SD = 2.5])4.  The sample comprised five age groups: 
20-29 (N = 201), 30-39 (N = 199), 40-49 (N = 225), 50-59 (N = 229), and over 60 (N = 221).  
The order of memory recall, as well as the order of survey blocks, was counterbalanced across 
participants5.  On average, it took 45 minutes to complete the survey. Sample characteristics are 
reported in Table 1.  Means, standard deviations, alpha reliabilities and intercorrelations for all 
variables are given in Table 2 (Supplementary Material of Study 1 is presented in Appendix B).   
 
Table 1 – Sample Characteristics 
 
age group: 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 over 60 Total  
Sex (% males) 45.8 49.2 47.1 46.3 48.4 47.3 
Race/ethnicity (%) 
African Americans 
Other ethnic groups 
 
22.9 
24.9 
 
20.1 
29.1 
 
24.9 
22.7 
 
24.0 
21.4 
 
24.0 
19.9 
 
23.3 
23.4 
Marital Status (%) 
Single/never married 
Married 
In a committed relationship 
Separated/Divorced 
Widowed 
 
55.0 
23.5 
19.0 
1.5 
1.0 
 
28.4 
52.3 
13.7 
4.6 
1.0 
 
21.4 
56.7 
10.3 
10.3 
1.3 
 
16.4 
55.3 
8.4 
16.8 
3.1 
 
10.5 
58.6 
2.7 
20.9 
7.3 
 
25.7 
49.8 
10.6 
11.2 
2.8 
Note. N = 1,075 that recalled at least one memory. Specifically, N = 1,057 had Turning Point and N 
= 1,007 had Childhood memory; 944 respondents had valid data for both types of memory. 
 
 
                                                     
4
 On-line data were screened creating a series of flag variables.  First, IP address was used to identify 
possible duplicate cases (i.e. those who completed the survey more than one time).  Second, open-ended 
answers were examined to identify invalid cases (e.g., non-words, non-sense memory narratives such as 
“life is beautiful”) and respondents who gave the same score to every item of self-report questionnaires 
were recognized as straight-liners.  As an additional control, speeders (i.e. those who took less than 10 
minutes to complete the survey) were flagged.  A bogus item was also included in the survey (i.e. “Soccer 
is played with a bat”, from 1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).   
5
 Forty-seven percent of the sample completed the Memory Task (Block 1) first and 53% of the sample 
completed the Questionnaires (Block 2) first.  Half of the participants recalled the Turning Point Memory 
first, while the other half recalled the Childhood Memory first.  Independent t-tests were performed to test 
order effects on the memory measures; only 12 of 52 tests were significant.   
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Memory Task 
Using an adaptation of the Life Story Interview instructions (McAdams, 2008), 
participants were asked to recall (write) two ‘key’ moments of their past lives (see Appendix A 
for details).  Specifically, they were asked to write about an important life-changing event (i.e., 
Turning Point Memory):  “In looking back over your life, it may be possible to identify certain 
key moments that stand out as turning points––episodes that marked an important change in you 
or your life story.  Please identify a particular episode in your life story that you now see as a 
turning point in your life.  If you cannot identify a key turning point that stands out clearly, 
please describe some event in your life wherein you went through an important change of some 
kind.  Please describe what happened, where and when, who was involved, and what you were 
thinking and feeling.”  And, to describe an important event from their early childhood years (i.e., 
Childhood Memory):  “Think about an event from your early childhood that stands out in some 
way. Please describe this event in detail. What happened, where and when, who was involved, 
and what were you thinking and feeling?”  Participants rated the affect and phenomenological 
experiences of each memory, reporting their age at the time of the recalled event.   
Emotions during recall.  After describing each memory, participants rated their emotions 
during recall on a 5-point response scale (from 1 = very slightly or not at all to 5 = extremely).  
They rated six positive (proud, inspired, exited, strong, determined, enthusiastic) and six 
negative emotions (upset, scared, ashamed, hostile, guilty, distressed) drawn from the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  The individual 
emotions were composited into Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) scales for each 
memory.  Cronbach’s alphas of the PA and NA scales were above .84 for both memories.   
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Memory phenomenology.  Participants completed the 31-item short form of the MEQ 
(Luchetti & Sutin, 2015), rating Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Sensory Details, Emotional 
Intensity, Visual Perspective, Time Perspective, Sharing, Distancing, and Valence on 5-point 
response scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) for each memory type.   
Despite their short-length, the alphas of the scales were acceptable for both the Turning Point 
and Childhood Memory (see Table 2).  Except for Coherence, Accessibility, Sensory Details 
(alphas ~ .55), scales reliability ranged from .62 (i.e. Visual Perspective) to .86 (i.e. Valence) for 
the Turning Point Memory (median alpha across scales = .65) and from .60 (i.e. Visual 
Perspective) to .87 (i.e. Valence) for the Childhood Memory (median alpha across scales =.72)6.   
Other self-report measures 
Personality.  Participants completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 
1999), a 44-item measure of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and 
Openness. Respondents were asked to rate each item (e.g. “I see Myself as Someone Who...” “Is 
depressed, blue”) on a 5-point response scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).  
In the present study, the focus is on the Neuroticism and Conscientiousness domains; alphas 
were above .80 for both scales.   
                                                     
6
 The alpha reliabilities of MEQ scales were, in general, lower for Turning Point Memory than for 
Childhood Memory.  The alpha of the Coherence and Sensory Details scales were ~.55 for both memory 
types.  Indeed, these scales include items that cover different aspects of the measured constructs, and the 
item heterogeneity could affect internal consistency.  For Coherence, items assess the specificity of 
information retrieved as well as the coherence of the memory in mind.  For Sensory Details, items assess 
the presence of sounds, smells, tastes in the memory, as well as the reliving sensations associated with the 
memory.  Accessibility was the least reliable scale across the two memories (.53 for Turning Point 
Memory and .58 for Childhood Memory).  Although the alphas for these scales were poor, Coherence, 
Accessibility and Sensory Details were retained because they correlated with personality and outcome 
variables in the expected direction.  Of note, McCrae and colleagues (McCrae, 2014; McCrae, Kurtz, 
Yamagata, & Terracciano, 2011) have recently suggested that other criteria besides alphas should be 
considered to quantify the validity of self-report scales: (1) longitudinal stability, (2) heritability, and (3) 
cross-observer agreement.  These criteria are largely unrelated to internal consistency (see McCrae, 2014; 
McCrae et al., 2011 for further details).  Nevertheless, as note in the Discussion section, results should be 
interpreted with caution; replication is needed to strength the findings concerning these dimensions.   
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Psychological Distress (i.e. depression). Participants completed the Patient Health 
Questionnaire depression module (PHQ-9; Spitzer, Kroenke, & Williams, 1999).  They rated the 
frequency of 9 depressive symptoms (e.g. “feeling tired or having little energy”) on a 4-point 
response scale (from 0 = not at all to 3 = nearly every day).  The PHQ-9 score ranged from 0 to 
27; higher scores reflect higher symptoms of depression. 22.2% of the present sample scored ≥ 
the threshold score of 10 for moderate to severe symtomatology (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 
2001).   
Well-being (i.e. positive functioning and life satisfaction).  Participants answered the 8-
item Flourishing Scale (FS; Diener et al., 2009) and a single item on life satisfaction (i.e. “I am 
satisfied with my life”) on a 5-point response scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree).  FS provides an overall index of well-being and positive functioning; higher scores 
reflect respondents’ positive perception of themselves in various areas of functioning—e.g. 
experiencing positive relationships and having purpose in life.   
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Table 2 – Means and Standard Deviations, Alpha Reliabilities, and interrelations among variables 
 
Variables M SD N C PHQ-9 FS LS PA NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Neuroticism (N) 2.68 0.8 (.84)                 
  Conscientiousness (C) 3.93 0.6 - .49** (.81)                
  Depression (PHQ-9) 5.88 6.6   .54** - .49** (.93)               
  Positive Functioning (FS) 4.03 0.7 - .49**   .52** - .34** (.91)              
  Life Satisfaction (LS) 3.74 1.1 - .45**   .28** - .29**   .65** --             
Turning Point Memory                    
  Positive Affect (PA) 3.18 1.3 - .25**   .15** - .13**   .30**   .26** (.91)            
  Negative Affect (NA) 2.08 1.0   .28** - .21**   .30** - .17** - .14** - .40** (.84)           
  1. Vividness 4.12 0.8 - .18**   .34** - .22**   .30**   .14**   .19** - .05
+
 (.63)          
  2. Coherence 3.83 0.8 - .19**   .31** - .24**   .20**   .06*   .06* - .08*   .50** (.57)         
  3. Accessibility 4.16 0.8 - .24**   .36** - .30**   .25**   .13**   .30** - .32**   .48**   .41** (.53)        
  4. Sensory Details 3.66 0.8 - .20**   .30** - .20**   .30**   .18**   .21** - .06   .59**   .36**   .37** (.55)       
  5. Emotional Intensity 3.92 0.9   .00   .17** - .02   .17**   .05   .01   .21**   .42**   .27**   .18**   .48** (.72)      
  6. Visual Perspective 3.43 0.9 - .05   .09** - .09**   .02 - .00   .01 - .12**   .20**   .21**   .26**   .08**   .05
+
 (.62)     
  7. Time Perspective 3.95 0.9 - .20**   .32** - .19**   .29**   .13**   .24** - .10**   .64**   .47**   .43**   .59**   .38**   .15** (.67)    
  8. Sharing 3.16 1.2 - .12**   .14** - .09**   .22**   .18**   .36** - .16**   .30**   .07*   .30**   .28**   .12**   .03   .29** (.81)   
  9. Distancing 3.20 1.2   .10** - .07*   .09** - .05
+
 - .12
** - .28**   .24** - .11** - .09** - .17** - .19**   .00 - .08* - .15** - .24** (.81)  
  10. Valence 3.57 1.4 - .25**   .19** - .24**   .25**   .20**   .68** - .56**   .15**   .11**   .40**   .17** - .11**   .06*   .21**   .37** - .31** (.86) 
  Age at the event 24.8 12.0 - .05
+
   .04 - .06
+
   .01 - .01   .05   .02   .14
**   .09**   .04   .14**   .13**   .10**   .18**   .16**   .00 - .01 
Childhood Memory                    
  Positive Affect (PA) 2.48 1.3 - .16**   .07* - .06
+
   .16
**   .16** (.92)            
  Negative Affect (NA) 2.06 1.1   .15** - .12**   .27** - .11** - .06
+
 - .36
** (.85)           
  1. Vividness 3.76 0.9 - .14**   .30** - .11**   .20**   .07*    .13**   .05 (.73)          
  2. Coherence 3.82 0.8 - .15**   .30** - .18**   .19**   .04 - .10** - .03   .52** (.59)         
  3. Accessibility 3.99 0.9 - .17**   .32** - .23**   .18**   .08*   .12** - .26**   .49**   .47** (.58)        
  4. Sensory Details 3.41 0.8 - .16**   .28** - .13**   .22**   .10**   .18**   .06   .61**   .34**   .37** (.59)       
  5. Emotional Intensity 3.38 1.0   .01   .14**   .02   .11** - .01   .14**   .27**   .42**   .15**   .11**   .53** (.78)      
  6. Visual Perspective 3.22 0.9 - .04   .11** - .08* - .00 - .02 - .08* - .07*   .16**   .22**   .21**   .11**   .00 (.60)     
  7. Time Perspective 3.38 1.1 - .17**   .27** - .10**   .20**   .10**   .24**   .06   .63**   .32**   .31**   .58**   .42**   .04 (.71)    
  8. Sharing 2.60 1.1 - .10**   .06 - .02   .12**   .12**   .30** - .09**   .20**   .03   .16**   .18**   .04 - .04   .24** (.79)   
  9. Distancing 3.22 1.1   .09** - .03   .09** - .04 - .12** - .26**   .19** - .11** - .12** - .19** - .16** - .06
+
 - .09
** - .11** - .17** (.77)  
  10. Valence 3.27 1.4 - .17**   .07* - .19**   .09**   .11**   .65** - .63**   .02 - .04   .23**   .07* - .12**   .04   .08*   .23** - .29** (.87) 
  Age at the event 7.97 3.40 - .06
+
   .02 - .01 - .02 - .01   .16
**   .11**   .05 - .08** - .04   .08**   .15** - .02   .15**   .01   .00   .01 
Note. N = 1,057 had Turning Point and N = 1,007 had Childhood memory. Alpha reliabilities are shown on the diagonal. Although the alpha for 
Coherence, Accessibility and Sensory Details were poor, these scales were retained because they correlated with personality and outcome variables 
in the expected direction. 
+ 
p < .10. 
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
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Results 
The results are divided into two sections that refer to the two main research questions.  
The first section examined age differences in memory affect and phenomenology across the adult 
lifespan.  In particular, both linear and quadratic trends were tested for Turning Point and 
Childhood Memory, separately.  The second section focuses on the interrelation between 
memory, personality and positive/negative outcome variables: depression, positive functioning 
and life satisfaction.  In particular, specific dimensions––i.e. Positive and Negative Affect, 
Vividness, Coherence, Emotional Intensity and Distancing––were tested as possible mediators of 
the association between Neuroticism and Conscientiousness and the psychological outcomes.   
(1) Age differences in memory affect and phenomenology across the adult lifespan 
To test the effect of age on memory affect and phenomenology, regression analyses were 
conducted for each memory, controlling for sex, race/ethnicity, education and memory recency 
(i.e. age at the time of the recalled event).  Potential non-linear relations were examined by 
including the squared term of age in the model (Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997).  Although a 
linear increase in specific dimensions (e.g. Coherence) is expected, a decrease is also hypnotized 
in later ages.  Aiken and West’s (1991) procedure was used to test the moderating role of sex on 
age-related phenomenological changes.   
Results indicated that there are age differences in memory affect and phenomenology 
across adulthood.  For the Turning Point memory, an effect of age was found for most of the 
MEQ scales (highest β was .18 for Coherence), except for Visual Perspective and Sharing (see 
Table 3 for details).  Specifically, a linear increase was observed for the Vividness, Coherence, 
Accessibility, Sensory Details, Time Perspective and Valence scales; a linear decrease was found 
for Distancing.  That is, with age, participants tended to report more intense phenomenological 
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qualities—i.e. they rated their Turning Point Memory as more vivid, coherent, easily accessible 
and positively valenced, as having more sensory details and a clearer time perspective, and 
perceived them as less psychologically distant (Figure 2, Section a).  However, a quadratic trend 
was also found for Accessibility (p < .01), Sensory Details and Emotional Intensity (p < .10); 
that is, these qualities increased in early adulthood, stabilised during mid-life and slightly 
decreased at later ages.  A linear decrease with age was observed for the Negative Affect scale of 
the PANAS (β = -.12, p < .001), whereas no effect of age was found for the Positive Affect scale 
(β = .01, p = .764).   
Similarly, there were age differences in most of the phenomenological qualities of the 
Childhood Memory (except Distancing and Valence dimensions; see Table 3).  Specifically, a 
linear increase was observed with age for Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Sensory Details, 
Visual Perspective, Time Perspective (highest β was .16 for Coherence), while a linear decrease 
was found for Sharing (Figure 2, Section b).  That is, older participants tended to report a more 
vivid and coherent Childhood Memory, rated them as more easily accessible, as having more 
sensory details and a clearer time perspective, retrieved them from a first-person visual 
perspective, but shared them less with others.  A quadratic trend was also observed for 
Coherence (p < .10), Accessibility and Emotional Intensity (p < .05); these phenomenological 
qualities tended to remain roughly stable at older ages.  No effect was observed for either the 
Positive or Negative Affect scales (βs ~ -.02, ps > .400).   
Of note, recency (i.e., the age at the time of the event) was associated with memory 
phenomenology but did not account for the age differences: Recent memories tended to have 
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more intense phenomenological qualities (e.g., more Emotional Intensity).  Though small in size, 
the effect of age was generally larger than the effect of recency (median Δ ~ .05 across scales)7,8.   
There were also differences in phenomenology by gender.  Specifically, for the Turning 
Point memory, women scored higher than men on Vividness, Sensory Details, Emotional 
Intensity, Visual and Time Perspective, while men score higher on Valence.  Moreover, sex 
moderated the effect of age on Coherence (β = -.06, p = .041):  Women reported more coherent 
memories than men, especially in early adulthood.  No other significant interactions were found 
between age and sex for the Turning Point memory.  Similarly, women rated their Childhood 
Memory as more emotionally intense and rich in sensory details and less distanced from the self 
than men, differences that were apparent across the different age groups.  
                                                     
7
 Of 1,075 participants, only 78 (7.3%) were flagged as speeders (i.e., took less than 10 minutes to 
complete the survey).  When excluding speeders, the observed effects of age on memory remain 
significant.  Moreover, results held when additionally controlling for recall/block order in the regression 
models.   
8
 Given that depression symptoms (Sutin et al., 2013) and subjective well-being (Ramsey & Gentzler, 
2014) changes across the adult life span, these variables were included as covariates in the regression 
models.  Though reduced, the effect of age on phenomenology remained significant when controlling for 
depression scores; the only exceptions were for Sensory Details (p > .05 for both memory), Time 
Perspective and Valence (p > .05 for Turning Point).  The effect of age remained significant for all 
dimensions when controlling for the well-being variables.  No significant interactions were observed 
between age and either depression or well-being.   
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Table 3 – Effect of Age on Memory Phenomenology 
 
Variables 
Vividness Coherence Accessibility 
Sensory 
Details 
Emotional 
Intensity 
Visual 
Perspective 
Time 
Perspective 
Sharing Distancing Valence 
B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β 
Turning Point Memory                     
Age at the event (recency)  .01(.00)  .08
*   .00(.00) .02  .00(.00) -.01  .01(.00) .09**  .01(.00) .11**  .01(.00) .07*  .01(.00)  .14**  .02(.00)  .17**  .00(.00) .04 -.00(.00) -.05 
Age Centered  .01(.00)  .16
**   .01(.00) .18**  .01(.00)  .13**  .01(.00) .11**  .00(.00) .06+  .00(.00) .06+  .01(.00)  .09** -.00(.00) -.03 -.01(.00) -.11**  .01(.00)  .09** 
Age Squared -.00(.00) - .02   .00(.00) -.05  .00(.00) -.08
**  .00(.00) -.06+  .00(.00) -.06+  .00(.00) -.05 -.00(.00)  .00 -.00(.00) -.02  .00(.00) .03  .00(.00)  .00 
Sex  .13(.05)  .08
*   .05(.05) .03  .08(.05)  .04  .12(.05) .07*  .23(.06) .12**  .13(.06) .07*  .15(.06)  .08**  .05(.08)  .02 -.03(.08) -.01 -.21(.09) -.07* 
Race (African American)  .09(.06)  .04   .08(.07) .04  .06(.07)  .03  .08(.06) .04  .01(.07) .00 -.27(.07) -.12
**  .20(.07)  .09**  .05(.09)  .02  .22(.10) .08*  .20(.11)  .06+ 
Race (Other ethnic groups) -.11(.06) -.05 -.00(.07) .00 -.15(.07) -.08
* -.02(.06) -.01 -.12(.07) -.06+ -.28(.07) -.13**  .01(.07)  .00 -.16(.09) -.06+ -.10(.09) -.04  .09(.11)  .03 
Education (years)  .01(.01)  .02   .02(.01) .05  .05(.01)  .14
** -.03(.01) -.10**  .00(.01) .01  .04(.01) .12** -.00(.01) -.01  .00(.01)  .03 -.02(.01) -.04  .01(.02)  .02 
Adjusted R2 
 
 .05    .03   .04   .04   .03   .04   .05   .02   .02   .01  
Childhood Memory                     
Memory Age (recency)  .01(.01)  .05 -.02(.01) -.07
* -.01(.00) -.03  .02(.01)  .08*  .05(.01)  .16** -.00(.01) -.01  .04(.01)  .12**  .00(.00) -.00 -.00(.01) -.01 -.00(.01) -.00 
Age Centered  .01(.00)  .11
**  .01(.00)  .16**  .01(.00)  .12**  .00(.00)  .07*  .00(.00)  .04  .00(.00)  .08*  .01(.00)  .11** -.01(.00) -.09** -.00(.00) -.05  .00(.00)  .05 
Age Squared  .00(.00) -.03  .00(.00) - .06
+  .00(.00) -.08*  .00(.00) -.05  .00(.00) -.07* -.00(.00) -.02  .00(.00) -.02 -.00(.00) -.00  .00(.00) .00  .00(.00)  .04 
Sex  .08(.06)  .04  .05(.05)  .03  .07(.06)  .04  .13(.05)  .08
*  .14(.07)  .06*  .06(.06)  .03  .07(.07)  .03 -.06(.07) -.03 -.15(.07) -.07* -.00(.10) -.00 
Race (African American)  .21(.08)  .09
**  .05(.07)  .03  .02(.07)  .01  .08(.07)  .04  .01(.09)  .00 -.08(.08) -.03  .25(.09)  .10**  .06(.09)  .02  .27(.09) .10** -.05(.12) -.01 
Race (Other ethnic groups) -.04(.07) -.02 -.08(.07) -.04 -.09(.07) -.04 -.03(.06) -.02  .03(.08)  .01 -.14(.07) -.07
+  .14(.08)  .06+  .05(.09)  .02  .03(.09) .01  .12(.12)  .04 
Education (years) -01(.01) -.05  .01(.01)  .03  .01(.01)  .04 -.01(.01) -.04 -.02(.01) -.05  .01(.01)  .03 -.06(.01) -.14
** -.02(.01) -.04 -.03(.01) -.08*  .01(.02)  .02 
Adjusted R2  .02   .03   .02 ¤   .02   .03   .01 ¤   .05   .00 ¤   .01   .00  
Note.  B = Unstandardized regression coefficient; SE = Standard Error of B; β = Standardized regression coefficient.  
+ 
p < .10. 
*
 p < .05. 
** 
p < .01. 
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(a) Turning Point Memory 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Section (a): Turning Point Memory. Regression lines of each phenomenological dimensions, adjusted for demographic factors and memory recency. 
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(b) Childhood Memory 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Section (b): Childhood Memory. Regression lines of each phenomenological dimensions, adjusted for demographic factors and memory recency.
Study 1 
54 
 
(2) Memory as potential mediator of the effect of personality on outcome variables 
As expected, Neuroticism correlated positively with depressive symptoms and negatively 
with positive functioning and life satisfaction, whereas Conscientiousness correlated negatively 
with depressive symptoms and positively with the well-being variables.  Neuroticism and 
Conscientiousness were also related significantly to memory affect and phenomenology (see 
Table 2 above).  Specifically, Neuroticism correlated positively with Negative Affect and 
Distancing, and negatively with Positive Affect, Vividness and Coherence, across memories; it 
was, however, unrelated to Emotional Intensity.  Conscientiousness correlated positively with 
Positive Affect, Vividness, Coherence, and Emotional Intensity, and negatively with Negative 
Affect and Distancing.  Both personality and the memory variables were related to the 
psychological outcomes.   
Next, these memory variables were tested as possible mediators between personality (i.e. 
Neuroticism and Conscientiousness) and the psychological outcomes.  The SPSS macro 
developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) was used to test multiple mediators via bootstrapping.  
This procedure allows testing potential mediators simultaneously and thus it is useful for the 
present research given that memory variables are not completely independent.  It provides both 
the indirect effect of each variable, conditional on the effect of all of the other mediators, and the 
total indirect effect of all proposed mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  Mediation analyses 
were run for each memory separately, using personality scores (Neuroticism or 
Conscientiousness) as predictors, Positive Affect, Negative Affect, Vividness, Coherence, 
Emotional Intensity and Distancing as mediators, and outcome variables of interest (depression, 
positive functioning or life satisfaction) as the criterion (controlling for demographic variables).  
The bootstrap estimates presented here are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples.  
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When considering negative psychological outcomes (i.e. depressive symptoms), 
mediation analyses partially supported the hypothesized model.  Table 4 shows the indirect 
effects of personality on depressive symptoms through the proposed mediators, and Table 5 
shows the path coefficients for each personality dimension.  As expected, for both memory 
types, Coherence and memory affect significantly mediated the neuroticism-depression 
association.  Participants high in Neuroticism reported more depressive symptoms, in part, 
because their memories were incoherent and more negative (and less positive) in affect.  A 
somewhat opposite pattern of mediation was found for the conscientiousness-depression 
association.  In particular, participants high in Conscientiousness rated their Turning Point (but 
not Childhood Memory) as less affectively negative and as more coherent, which were in turn 
qualities related to fewer depressive symptoms.   
 
Table 4 – Mediation of the Effect of Personality on Depressive Symptoms  
through Memory Affect and Phenomenology 
 
Variable 
Turning Point  Childhood Memory 
B(SE) BC 95% CI  B(SE) BC 95% CI 
Neuroticism        
Positive Affect - .118(.059)
*
 - .249     - .014  - .090(.046)
*
 - .198     - .017 
Negative Affect   .240(.076)
*
   .103        .403    .200(.066)
*
   .091        .352 
Vividness   .092(.045)
*
   .021        .201    .004(.032) - .058       .073 
Coherence   .079(.042)
*
   .012        .179    .050(.034)
*
   .000        .142 
Emotional Intensity - .000(.007) - .018       .014  - .001(.014)  - .033       .025 
Distancing   .002(.019) - .038       .038  - .001(.018) - .039       .036 
Total   .295(.083)
*
   .137        .466    .161(.065)
*
   .043   .300 
       
Conscientiousness       
Positive Affect   .020(.052) - .076   .132    .027(.033) - .021       .120 
Negative Affect - .269(.087)
*
 - .472     - .121  - .199(.080)
*
 - .400     - .074 
Vividness - .153(.108) - .383       .044    .049(.095) - .135       .239 
Coherence - .180(.094)
*
 - .379     - .008  - .090(.090) - .279       .076 
Emotional Intensity   .075(.050) - .009       .194    .013(.044) - .068       .109 
Distancing - .003(.020) - .050       .035  - .006(.014) - .057       .011 
Total - .509(.139)
*
 - .792 - .247  - .207(.130) - .480       .033 
Note. N = 971 for Turning Point and N = 931 for Childhood Memory. Demographic factors (i.e. age, age 
squared, sex, race/ethnicity) are included as covariates in the model. B = non-standardized coefficient; SE = 
standard error of B; BC = bias corrected; CI = confidence interval; 5,000 bootstrap samples. 
*p < .05. 
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The memory characteristics did not completely mediate personality’s association with 
depressive symptoms; neuroticism and conscientiousness still had significant direct effects.  
Mediation effects were modest in magnitude (Δβ ~.05 and ~.02, for Turning Point and 
Childhood Memory, respectively).  Vividness, Emotional Intensity and Distancing did not 
mediate the relation between personality and depressive symptoms in either memory.   
 
Table 5 – Coefficients for the Mediation of the Effect of Personality on Depressive Symptoms 
through Memory Affect and Phenomenology 
 
 Turning Point Childhood Memory 
 Memory  
(Path a) 
Depression  
(Path b) 
Memory  
(Path a) 
Depression 
(Path b) 
Variable B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) Β 
Neuroticism         
Positive Affect - .401(.053) - .244
**
   .297(.127)   .070
*
 - .246(.054) - .153
**
   .372(.135)        .086
**
 
Negative Affect   .320(.041)   .252
**
   .756(.166)   .137
**
   .194(.044)  - .148
**
  1.092(.162)      .206
**
 
Vividness - .156(.032) - .157
**
 - .568(.230) - .081
*
 - .135(.038) - .120
**
 - .032(.212)        - .005 
Coherence - .159 (.034) - .154
**
 - .477(.205) - .071
*
 - .130(.034) - .127
**
 - .390(.220)     - .057
+
 
Emotional Intensity   .001(.038)   .001   .071(.180)   .012   .008(.043)   .006 - .237(.171)         - .043 
Distancing   .140 (.049)   .096
**
   .013(.132)   .003   .120(.045)   .089
**
 - .008(.145)          - .002 
 Path c 
3.756(.193) 
 
.537
**
 
Direct Effect 
3.464(.200) 
 
  .495
**
 
Path c 
3.777(.195) 
 
.542
**
 
Direct Effect 
3.616 (.195) 
 
.519
**
 
Conscientiousness         
Positive Affect   .332(.072)   .154
**
   .064(.135)   .015   .173(.072)   .082
*
   .161(.144)        .037 
Negative Affect - .308(.054) - .185
**
   .873(.179)   .159
**
 - .199(.059)     - .115
**
  1.011(.176)       .190
**
 
Vividness   .396(.041)   .303
**
 - .378(.250) - .054   .409(.049)        .273
**
   .118(.229)         .019 
Coherence   .367(.044)   .269
**
 - .482(.221) - .072
*
   .360(.044)    .267
**
 - .255(.239)        - .038 
Emotional Intensity   .240(.050)   .158
**
   .307(.194)   .051   .228 (.056)   .138
**
   .057(.184)         .010 
Distancing - .135(.064) - .070
*
   .027(.142)   .006 - .039(.060)        - .022   .181(.157)         .035 
 Path c 
-3.828(.273) 
 
- .415
**
 
Direct Effect 
- 3.320(.289) 
 
- .360
**
 
Path c 
-3.964(.278) 
 
- .431
**
 
Direct Effect 
-3.757(.288)  
 
- .409
**
 
Note. B = non-standardized coefficient; SE = standard error of B; β = standardized coefficient.  
+
 p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. 
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For well-being, other phenomenological dimensions emerged as relevant mediators 
(Table 6).  For both memory types, Distancing and Positive Affect significantly mediated the 
association between neuroticism and FS scores.  Participants high in Neuroticism perceived their 
memories as psychologically distant and rated them as less affectively positive, which were, in 
turn, aspects that were associated with lower overall well-being.  Moreover, Vividness (for 
Turning Point only) and Coherence (for Childhood Memory only) emerged also as significant 
mediators of the neuroticism association with the flourishing scale; that is, those with high 
Neuroticism reported less well-being, in part, because they tended to report less vivid Turning 
Point and less coherent Childhood Memory (see Table 7).  By contrast, participants high in 
Conscientiousness rated their Turning Point (but not Childhood Memory) as more vivid and 
emotionally intense, which were in turn qualities related to positive functioning.  A less clear 
pattern of mediation, however, emerged when considering life satisfaction as outcome: 
Coherence (of Turning Point Memory) and Distancing (of Childhood Memory) mediated life 
satisfaction association with Neuroticism, while Emotional Intensity mediated life satisfaction 
association with Conscientiousness (for Childhood Memory only). 
As noted before, phenomenology did not completely mediate the association between 
personality and positive functioning and life satisfaction; neuroticism and conscientiousness still 
had significant direct effects in predicting well-being.  Mediation effects were modest in 
magnitude (Δβ ranged from .03 to .06 for Turning Point and from .00 to .03 for Childhood 
Memory).  
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Table 6 – Mediation of the Effect of Personality on well-being variables  
through Memory Affect and Phenomenology 
 
Variable 
Positive Functioning  Life Satisfaction 
Turning Point  Childhood Memory  Turning Point  Childhood Memory 
B(SE) BC 95% CI B(SE) BC 95% CI  B(SE) BC 95% CI  B(SE) BC 95% CI 
Neuroticism                
Positive Affect - .033(.008)
*
   - .050     - .019  - .011(.005)
*
    - .023     - .003  - .046(.013)
*
   - .073     - .023 - .021(.009)
*
    - .045     - .009 
Negative Affect - .002(.007)    - .017        .011  - .005(.004)    - .014     .003    .009 (.012)    - .013      .033    .012(.007)
 *
      .000       .030 
Vividness - .018(.006)
*
     - .033     - .008  - .003(.004)    - .013      .004  - .011(.008)     - .030     .003  - .001(.007)    - .016      .013 
Coherence - .001(.004)   - .010        .007  - .010(.005)
*
   - .022     - .003    .014(.008)
*
     .001      .033    .004(.007)   - .009     .020 
Emotional Intensity - .000(.003)     - .007        .006    .000(.002) - .005      .006  - .000(.002)     - .007      .003  - .000(.003) - .008      .004 
Distancing   .004(.003)
*
     .000      .013    .005(.003)
* 
     .001       .013  - .007(.005)    - .020      .001  - .007(.005)
* 
   - .020     - .000 
Total - .050(.011)
*
 - .074     - .029   -.025(.008)
*
      - .041     - .010  - .040(.018)
*
 - .077    - .007  -.014(.012)      - .040    .008 
                
Conscientiousness                
Positive Affect   .036(.009)
*
     .020     .057    .011(.014)
*
    .002        .026    .054(.015)
*
     .028     .088    .021(.011)
*
    .003        .047 
Negative Affect   .002(.007)     - .010        .017    .001(.006) - .008      .011    .000(.012)     - .024      .024  - .016(.010)
*
 - .042      - .000 
Vividness   .030(.012)
*
     .007      .055  - .002(.005)    - .024      .020    .021(.022)    - .022      .065  - .005(.022)    - .048      .038 
Coherence - .001(.010)     - .021        .019    .019(.011)   - .003      .044  - .027(.017)     - .063      .006  - .017(.020)   - .059      .020 
Emotional Intensity   .011(.006)
* 
         .001      .026    .002(.012)    - .008      .013    .003(.010)
 
       - .017      .025  - .022(.011)
 *
    - .049      - .005 
Distancing - .004(.003)    - .013        .000  - .000(.005)      - .006      .001    .007(.006)    - .001      .022  - .003(.006)      - .007      .018 
Total   .075(.016)
*
   .045   .109    .031(.001)
*
   .004      .060    .058(.028)
*
   .004     .113  - .035(.027) - .090    .016 
Note. N = 970 for Turning Point and N = 930 for Childhood Memory. Demographic factors (i.e. age, age squared, sex, race/ethnicity) are 
included as covariates in the model. B = non-standardized coefficient; SE = standard error of B; BC = bias corrected; CI = confidence 
interval; 5,000 bootstrap samples. 
*p <.05. 
M. Luchetti 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 – Coefficients for the Mediation of the Effect of Personality on well-being variables 
through Memory Affect and Phenomenology 
 
 Turning Point Childhood Memory 
 Memory  
(Path a) 
Positive Functioning  
(Path b) 
Life Satisfaction 
(Path b) 
Memory  
(Path a) 
Positive Functioning  
(Path b) 
Life Satisfaction 
(Path b) 
Variable B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β B(SE) β 
Neuroticism             
Positive Affect - .401(.053) - .244
**
   .083(.015)   .166
**
   .114(.027)   .138
**
 - .246(.054) - .153
**
   .045(.016)   .088
**
   .092(.029)   .108
**
 
Negative Affect   .320(.041)   .252
**
 - .006(.020)    - .009   .031(.035)   .029   .194(.044)  - .148
**
 - .025(.020) - .041   .069(.035)   .065
*
 
Vividness - .156(.032) - .157
**
   .113(.027)       .136
**
   .070(.048)   .051 - .135(.038) - .120
**
   .024(.026)   .033   .009(.045)   .007 
Coherence - .159 (.034) - .154
**
   .009(.024)        .011 - .085(.043) - .064
*
 - .130(.034) - .127
**
   .082(.027)   .102
**
 - .033(.047) - .025 
Emotional Intensity   .001(.038)   .001   .081(.021)    .113
**
   .049(.038)   .041   .008(.043)   .006   .048(.021)   .074
*
 - .043(.036) - .039 
Distancing   .140 (.049)   .096
**
   .029(.016)   .051
+
 - .041(.028) - .044   .120(.045)   .089
**
   .037(.018)   .061
*
 - .057(.031) - .055
+
 
 Path c 
Direct Effect 
 
 
-.439(.024) 
-.389(.024) 
- .531
**
 
- .470
**
 
-.680(.040) 
-.640(.042) 
- .499
**
 
- .470
**
 
Path c 
Direct Effect 
 
  
-.447 (.024) 
-.422 (.024) 
  .543
** 
   
.513
**
 
-.712 (.041) 
-.698 (.041) 
  .518
** 
   
.508
**
 
Conscientiousness             
Positive Affect   .332(.072)   .154
**
   .107(.015)   .214
**
   .158(.028)   .192
**
   .173(.072)   .082
*
 .069(.017)   .135
**
   .133(.031) .156
**
 
Negative Affect - .308(.054) - .185
**
 - .007(.020) - .010 - .001(.038) - .001 - .199(.059)     - .115
**
 -.007(.020) - .012   .079(.038) .076
*
 
Vividness   .396(.041)   .303
**
   .074(.028)   .089
**
   .050(.053)   .037   .409(.049)      .273
**
 -.005(.027) - .007 - .012(.049) -.010 
Coherence   .367(.044)   .269
**
 - .003(.025) - .004 - .073(.046) - .056   .360(.044)    .267
**
 .052(.028)   .065
+
 - .047(.051) -.035 
Emotional Intensity   .240(.050)   .158
**
   .047(.022)   .066
*
   .012(.041)   .010   .228(.056)   .138
**
 .008(.021)   .013 - .096(.039) -.088
*
 
Distancing - .135(.064) - .070
*
   .026(.016)   .046 - .044(.030) - .047 - .039(.060)        - .022 .012(.018)   .019 - .090(.033) -.088
**
 
 Path c 
Direct Effect 
 .572 (.031) 
.496(.032) 
  .526
** 
  .457
**
 
.566 (.058) 
.506(.061) 
  .316
** 
  .284
**
 
Path c 
Direct Effect 
 
  
.581(.032) 
.550(.033) 
  .536
**
 
  .507
**
 
  .598 (.059) 
  .632 (.062) 
 .329
** 
   
.348
**
 
Note. B = non-standardized coefficient; SE = standard error of B; β = standardized coefficient.  
+
 p<.10. *p<.05. **p<.01. 
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Discussion 
The primary aim of the study was to explore age differences in autobiographical memory, 
considering the full-range of phenomenological memory experiences.  A large, stratified sample 
of adults aged 20-90 years retrieved two ‘key’ autobiographical episodes, a Turning Point and a 
Childhood Memory, and rated them using PANAS and MEQ scales.  Although older adults 
reported more phenomenological intense (i.e., more vivid, coherent, temporally clear, etc.) 
memories compared to younger adults, they also seemed to less easily access detailed and rich 
information in later ages.  The secondary aim of the study was to test whether phenomenology 
mediated personality (Neuroticism and Conscientiousness) associations with positive/negative 
outcome variables.  Participants completed measures of depression, positive functioning and life 
satisfaction, which have been consistently related to Neuroticism and Conscientiousness 
(Friedman & Kern, 2014).  For those participants high in Neuroticism and low in 
Conscientiousness, dimensions such as Coherence appeared critical in predicting level of 
depressive symptoms. Conversely, others dimensions (e.g. Distancing) appeared implicated in 
overall well-being.   
As observed in previous studies (e.g., Janssen et al., 2011; Kingo et al., 2013), 
phenomenology linearly increased through adult lifespan; however, a quadratic trend was also 
observed for Accessibility and Emotional Intensity (for both memories), Sensory Details 
(Turning Point Memory only) and Coherence (Childhood Memory only) scales. Although 
previous studies suggested episodic deficits in the elderly (Piolino et al., 2010; Piolino et al., 
2006), older adults seem to preserve some well-rehearsed and phenomenologically-rich 
memories. Age findings seemed to reflect the progressive integration of memories into 
participants’ life stories.  Coherence ratings, for example, tended to increase cross-sectionally 
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between early and middle adulthood, and remained roughly stable in later ages.  Still, with age, 
participants tended to distance less from their turning point events.  Other studies have indeed 
found an increase in narrative coherence (integration) from adolescence up to middle adulthood 
(e.g., Habermas & de Silveira, 2008; Habermas et al., 2013).  Younger participants may need 
time to comprehend the importance of past experiences (Linton, 1986), to relate and to integrate 
them with other parts of the life story (McAdams & Olson, 2010).  Early adulthood, in particular, 
is a time of tremendous consolidation of both autobiographical memories and self and identity 
(Montebarocci et al., 2014).  Though small in size (highest β = .18 for Coherence), the effect of 
age was larger than the effect of other factors known to affect phenomenology, i.e. the recency of 
the memory itself.   
The present findings confirmed the importance of Coherence dimension.  An indirect 
effect of Coherence linked personality and depression.  Individuals high in Neuroticism (or low 
in Conscientiousness) may have more incoherent memories, and this incoherence may create 
vulnerability to depression.  Incoherence has been previously found as a critical mediator of 
individual attachment style and psychological distress (Sutin & Gillath, 2009): Although the 
retrieval of vague memories may reduce the immediate impact of an event in individuals with 
avoidant style, it may also hinder the beneficial functions that memories serve, leading to greater 
psychological distress over time.  McAdams (2006b) maintained that a coherent life story 
contributes to psychological health: Individuals who are able to meaningfully connect their past 
experiences can use those experiences to understand themselves, or tell others about them.  All 
aspects that likely protect from psychological distress in general (Sutin & Gillath, 2009).  It 
worth to note that, here, Coherence refers to the participant’s subjective experience of the event 
in the memory as a logical story (Sutin & Robins, 2007).  It is possible that raters’ judgments of 
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narrative coherence would not correspond to the individuals’ phenomenological experience of 
memory coherence.  Nevertheless, the latter is equally important as the former.   
Other phenomenological dimensions appeared to mediate the personality link with 
overall well being.  For example, individuals high in Neuroticism had lower levels of well-being 
in part because they tended to distance themselves more from their past.  They may not integrate 
their life-changing experiences in the context of their lives.  Conversely, in response to their need 
for coherence, individual high in Conscientiousness tended to report more phenomenologically 
intense and affectively positive memories, enhancing their sense of well-being and satisfaction.  
Autobiographical memories are here proposed as dynamic expressions of personality functioning 
that partially contribute to adaptive/maladaptive psychological outcomes.  However, the nature 
of the study is primarily correlational and causal links cannot be inferred.  The association 
between memory, personality and outcome variables should be tested both concurrently and 
longitudinally (Study 2 constitutes an attempt).   
The present research has several limitations and opportunities for further research.  First, 
two memories were sampled in the present research.  Other ‘key’ memories (e.g. low point, high 
point, etc.) in addition to Turning Point and Childhood Memory should be also considered in 
future studies.  Second, participants completed an on-line survey.  Though the use of on-line 
questionnaires is becoming common practice in the field, it is possible that participants could 
have been distracted while completing the measures or have not followed properly the 
instructions.  For this reason, we created a series of ‘flag variables’ to check the validity of the 
data collected.  Findings held after excluding invalid cases (i.e. speeders).  Third, alpha 
reliabilities of the Coherence, Accessibility, and Sensory Details scales of the MEQ were poor 
for both memory types.  Although they were retained because they correlated in hypothesized 
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ways with the variables of interest (see Footnote 6 for details), replication is needed to strength 
the findings concerning these dimensions.  Finally, all of the measures were self-report.  The 
focus of the study was on how the individual understands his or her experiences, and on how this 
potential determines adaptive/maladaptive outcomes.  However, it would be informative to code 
the qualities of the memory from the narrative and see whether there is congruence between 
subjective and objective ratings of the memory.   
Despite the limitations, the present work increases our understanding of the interrelation 
between autobiographical memory, personality and positive/negative psychological outcomes 
(e.g. depression).  A deeper understanding is of fundamental importance for both theoretical and 
applied reasons.  For one, the relationship of personality with the experience of autobiographical 
memory may shed light on how individuals construe life story memories, and how the story they 
tell promotes social-emotional adjustment, psychological growth and wisdom (Blagov & Singer, 
2004).  It can also help to understand the role of memory phenomenology when designing 
interventions targeted at reducing psychological distress (or increasing overall well-being).  For 
example, on the basis of preliminary evidences (Reas, Williams, & Hermans, 2009), Dalgleish et 
al. (2014) have planned a clinical trial on the efficacy of a Memory Specificity Training (MEST) 
that aims to reduce depressive symptoms by targeting depression-related memory disturbances.  
There is also increasing evidence of the efficacy of Life Review interventions in alleviating 
depression symptoms and enhancing life satisfaction in the elderly (Latorre et al., 2015; Serrano, 
Latorre, Gatz, & Montanes, 2004).  In fact, as maintained by Singer and colleagues (Singer et al., 
2013; Singer & Bonalume, 2010; Singer & Conway, 2011), personal memories and life stories 
represent daily material to work on during clinical interactions.   
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Study 2: Continuity of Autobiographical Memory over time 
Memories for meaningful life events tend to preserve intense phenomenological qualities 
over time.  An individual may consistently rate one particular memory as extremely vivid and 
emotionally intense either because of the visual clarity and emotional charge of that particular 
memory or because all of his/her memories tend to be vivid and emotionally intense.  As shown 
by Rubin and colleagues (2004), beyond memory-specific characteristics, what is stable is the 
cognitive (retrieval) style of the individual.  Indeed, as summarized earlier, phenomenological 
qualities have been linked to underlining stable dispositions—i.e. personality (Rubin & Siegler, 
2004; Singer & Salovey, 1993), as well as to a variety of positive/negative psychological 
outcomes—well-being and life satisfaction (Philippe, Koestner, Beaulieu-Pelletier, & Lecours 
2011; Sutin, 2008), depression and anxiety (Sumner, 2012; Witheridge, Cabral, & Rector, 2010).  
To date, however, relatively few studies have assessed autobiographical memory longitudinally.  
And, the majority of the existing work has focused on the accuracy or the consistency of memory 
content, rather than on the continuity of the subjective experience of affect and phenomenology 
(though see Rubin et al., 2004; Thomsen et al., 2012).   
Applying a longitudinal design, the present research explored the affect and 
phenomenology of two particular autobiographical memories—a Turning Point Memory and a 
Childhood Memory—in a sample of Italian adults aged 20-40 years, over a 4-week period.  The 
research aimed to address the following questions:   
 Is memory affect and phenomenology stable across memories and over time?   
Specifically, continuity and change in memory affect and phenomenology were assessed 
by examining (a) correlation coefficients and (b) mean-level differences.  Correlations 
were used to determine the relative stability in memory ratings: Whether an individual 
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tends to score high (or low) on a particular dimension across memory and over time.  
Based on previous studies (Rubin et al., 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2005), test-retest 
coefficients around .40 to .60 were expected.  Additionally, mean differences were used 
to detect variation:  Whether the average amount of a particular dimension varies across 
memories and sections.  In this case, non-significant changes in memory ratings were 
expected at follow-up (Thomsen et al., 2012).   
 Is memory affect, phenomenology, and changes in phenomenology related to personality?   
As linked to important cognitive–affective processes, Neuroticism and Conscientiousness 
were expected to affect self-reported memory ratings.  Despite some modest 
inconsistencies in literature, individuals high in Neuroticism—who are inclined to 
experience a wide range of negative emotions—were expected to report more 
emotionally intense and negative memories, whereas individual high in 
Conscientiousness—who are inclined to be organized and disciplined—were expected to 
report more vivid and coherent memories (see Rubin et al., 2008; Sutin, 2008; Thomsen 
et al., 2014).  For the first time, these traits were also investigated in relation with 
changes in memory affect and phenomenology.   
 Is memory phenomenology and change in phenomenology related to clinically relevant 
outcome variables?   
Specific memory qualities were expected to relate to the negative/positive psychological 
outcomes of interest:  depression, overall well-being and life satisfaction.  In particular, 
individual with higher depressed affect are expected to show impoverished memories 
(e.g., Sumner, 2012; Bergouignan et al., 2008)—e.g., incoherent and affectively negative 
memories, retrieved them from a 3
rd
 person visual perspective.  On the other end, 
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individual high in well-being are expected to have memories with more rich and intense 
phenomenological qualities.  Changes in phenomenology were also investigated in 
relation with changes in positive/negative outcomes over time.   
 Does phenomenology mediate the effect of personality on outcome variables? 
Finally, the present study aimed to longitudinally test phenomenology and changes in 
phenomenology as potential mediators of the association between personality and 
depression, overall well-being and life satisfaction.  Indeed, autobiographical memory 
can be considered as a dynamic expression of personality functioning that may partially 
explain adaptive/maladaptive psychological outcomes.  This is an interesting avenue in 
the study of memory and personality (see Sutin, 2008), though additional studies are 
needed.   
 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
The current study utilized an on-line survey created with Qualtrics software and 
distributed by electronic mail to a community sample from Italy.  Participants provided informed 
consent in person at the time of recruitment.  They were asked to complete the same survey as 
Study 1––i.e. Memory Task (Block 1) and Questionnaires (Block 2)––on two different occasions 
separated in time (see Figure 1 for details).  Once the first survey was completed (Time 1), a 
second link was sent again to each respondent after 4 weeks (Time 2).  The order of memory 
recall, and the order of survey blocks, was counterbalanced across participants9.  On average, it 
                                                     
9
 Forty-three percent of the sample completed the Memory Task (Block 1) first and 57% of the sample 
completed the Questionnaires (Block2) first.  Half of the participants recalled the Turning Point Memory 
first, while the other half recalled the Childhood Memory first.  Independent t-tests were performed to test 
order effects on the memory measures; only 7 of 56 tests were significant.   
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took 40 minutes to complete the survey.  The 4 week interval was considered long enough 
because participants would not be able to remember the first set of ratings.   
A total of 104 participants responded to at least part of the survey at Time 1; 69.2% (N = 
72) responded at Time 2.  The time (days) between the two sessions varied across participants 
(M = 39.4, SD = 13.1).  Of note, given the amount of partial responses per session, only part of 
the sample had valid memory data at both time points.  Specifically, 99 participants answered at 
least one of the memory requests at Time 1, and 64 answered at least one memory at Time 2.  A 
total of 61 and 58 participants had respectively valid Turning Point and Childhood Memory at 
both sessions.  Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 (Supplementary Material of Study 2 
is presented in Appendix C).   
Memory task 
The memory requests used in Study 1––i.e. Turning Point and Childhood Memory 
requests––were translated into Italian using the standard translation/back-translation method.  
Participants were asked to rate memories on the same affect and phenomenological dimensions, 
completing the abbreviated version of PANAS and the short form of MEQ at both the Time 1 
and Time 2 sessions; instructions at Time 2 were identical to those used at Time 1.  Even though 
participants were not told whether or not to write about the same experience, the use of 
McAdams’s (2008) ‘key event’ requests would have assured the retrieval of the same memories 
across sessions.  Memories of Time 2 were coded as either the same or different from the 
memories of Time 1.  A memory was considered the same if the core event described was the 
same (e.g., first day of school).  A second judge independently coded whether the event was the 
same or not for a subset (20%) of the memories; high agreement with the first judge was 
observed (kappa ≥.90 for both memory types).   
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Figure 1: Study Design. Note that the order of memory recall, and the order of survey blocks, was 
counterbalanced across participants. TP = Turning Point; CM = Childhood Memory; PANAS = Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule; MEQ-SF = Memory Experiences Questionnaire – Short Form; BFI = Big Five 
Inventory; FS = Flourishing Scale; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire-9. 
 
 
In the present sample, the PANAS and MEQ scales showed acceptable-to-good reliability 
at both Time 1 and Time 2 (see Table 1).  Specifically, for both memory types, alphas for the PA 
and NA scales were over .80 at both time points.  For the Turning Point Memory, the median 
alpha across MEQ scales was .73 at Time 1 and .75 at Time 2; with the exception of 
Accessibility, Sensory Details, and Time Perspective, alphas ranged from .67 (Vividness) to .94 
(Valence) at Time 1, and from .64 (Coherence) to .90 (Sharing, Distancing, Valence) at Time 2. 
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For the Childhood Memory, the median alpha across MEQ scales was .77 at Time 1 and .81 at 
Time 2; with the exception of Sensory Details, alphas were above .70 at both time points10.   
Other self-reported measures 
At both time points, participants completed the Italian version of the Patient Health 
Questionnaire depression module (PHQ-9; Mazzotti et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 1999) and the 
Flourishing Scale (FS; Dienier et al., 2009), along with the single-item measure of life 
satisfaction (i.e. “I am satisfied with my life”).  In the present sample, Cronbach’s alphas were ≥ 
.80 (see Table 1).  Personality (i.e. Neuroticism and Conscientiousness) was assessed with the 
Big Five Inventory (BFI; Fossati, Borroni, Marchione, & Maffei, 2011; John & Srivastava, 1999) 
at Time 1.  Neuroticism had an alpha of .78 and Conscientiousness had an alpha of .83.   
At the end of each session, participants completed a multiple-choice checklist to indicate 
any potential stressful events (i.e. natural disaster, accident, life-threatening illness or injury, etc.) 
that occurred within the last month.  A yes/no variable was subsequently created to indicate the 
presence/absence of any of the listed events.   
  
                                                     
10
 The alpha reliabilities of MEQ scales were, in general, lower for Turning Point Memory than for 
Childhood Memory.  The alpha of the Sensory Details scale was <.60 for Turning Point Memory and ~.60 
for Childhood Memory.  Indeed, this scale includes items that cover different aspects of the measured 
construct, and the item heterogeneity could affect internal consistency: Items assess the presence of 
sounds, smells, tastes in the memory, as well as the reliving sensations associated with the memory.  For 
Turning Point Memory but not for Childhood Memory, two other MEQ scales showed alphas below or 
equal to .60, i.e. Accessibility and Time Perspective.  Despite that, these scales were retained in the 
present study.  First, in most of the cases, they correlated with personality, depression and well-being 
variables in predictable way.  For example, Accessibility of the Turning Point Memory was associated 
with low Neuroticism and high Conscientiousness at both time points.  Second, as suggested by McCrae 
and colleagues (McCrae, 2014; McCrae et al., 2011) other criteria besides alphas should be considered to 
quantify the validity of self-report scales, especially test-retest reliability (see McCrae, 2014; McCrae et 
al., 2011 for further details).  Nevertheless, as noted below (see Discussion section), caudation is needed 
in interpreting the results of the named scales. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
 Time 1   Time 2 
 M (SD)ª α  M (SD) α 
Age (years) 28.7 (3.9)   28.6 (3.7)  
Education (years) 17.7 (2.9)   18.2 (2.9)  
Males, count (%) 39 (37.5)   25 (35.7)  
Single/never married, count (%) 80 (76.9)    -  
Workers, count (%) 54 (51.9)   -  
Turning Point Memory        
  Positive Affect 2.98 (1.2) .88  2.78 (1.1) .88 
  Negative Affect 1.70 (0.8) .82  1.60 (0.8) .84 
  1. Vividness 4.16 (0.8) .67  3.91 (0.9) .82 
  2. Coherence 4.18 (0.9) .72  3.78 (0.9) .64 
  3. Accessibility 4.40 (0.6) .21  4.22 (0.9) .61 
  4. Sensory Details 3.55 (0.8) .50  3.28 (0.7) .29 
  5. Emotional Intensity 4.21 (0.9) .74  3.95 (0.8) .67 
  6. Visual Perspective 3.83 (1.1) .83  3.98 (1.0) .87 
  7. Time Perspective 3.95 (0.9) .56  3.52 (0.9) .64 
  8. Sharing 2.88 (1.3) .87  2.90 (1.2) .90 
  9. Distancing 3.19 (1.2) .89  3.37 (1.2) .90 
  10. Valence 3.57 (1.5) .94  3.70 (1.4) .90 
  Age at the event 20.5 (5.7)   20.5 (5.2)  
Childhood Memory        
  Positive Affect  2.53 (1.1) .85  2.32 (1.1) .87 
  Negative Affect  1.62 (0.9) .85  1.40 (0.6) .80 
  1. Vividness 3.32 (1.0) .81  3.22 (1.1) .81 
  2. Coherence 3.74 (1.0) .73  3.69 (1.0) .71 
  3. Accessibility 3.85 (1.0) .74  3.78 (1.0) .80 
  4. Sensory Details 3.12 (0.9) .60  3.05 (0.8) .64 
  5. Emotional Intensity 3.73 (1.0) .76  3.37 (1.0) .81 
  6. Visual Perspective 3.46 (1.1) .77  3.55 (1.1) .90 
  7. Time Perspective 2.72 (1.2) .77  2.73 (1.2) .74 
  8. Sharing 2.30 (1.1) .86  2.07 (1.1) .87 
  9. Distancing 3.03 (1.2) .86  2.99 (1.2) .86 
  10. Valence 3.79 (1.4) .90  3.73 (1.4) .93 
  Age at the event 5.70 (2.4)   6.19 (2.9)  
Neuroticism 3.20 (0.7) .78  -   
Conscientiousness 3.76 (0.7) .83  -   
Depression  6.27 (4.7) .84  5.39 (3.7) .80 
Positive Functioning  3.92 (0.6) .80  4.08 (0.6) .84 
Life Satisfaction (1-item) 3.59 (1.1)   3.83 (1.0)  
Yes/No stressful event, count (%) 21 (20.2)   5 (4.8)  
Total N 104   72  
Note. N = 99 completed the Memory Task (Block 1) at Time 1 and N = 64 at Time 
2.  N = 103 completed the Questionnaires (Block 2) at Time 1 and N = 72 at Time 
2.  Of note, 50.8% and 69.0% of participants reported, respectively, a different 
Turning Point and Childhood Memory at Time 2.   
ª Mean and standard deviations are reported unless otherwise specified.   
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Results 
The results are divided into three main sections that examine:  (1) continuity of affect and 
phenomenology across memories and (2) over time, and (3) correlates of phenomenological 
qualities and change in phenomenology.  After exploring mean-level differences, continuity was 
assessed by using correlations.  To extend the cross-sectional findings of Study 1, 
phenomenology was tested as a potential mediator of the longitudinal association between 
personality and the psychological outcomes (i.e. depression, positive functioning and life 
satisfaction).   
(1) Continuity of affect and phenomenology across memories  
First, sample-level differences between the Turning Point Memory and the Childhood 
Memory were examined.  A repeated measure Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed 
on memory ratings with Memory Type (Turning Point vs. Childhood Memory) as the within-
subject factor.  Participants tended to report more Positive Affect (but not Negative Affect) in the 
Turning Point Memory than in the Childhood Memory [F(1, 93) = 12.10, p = .001, partialη
2 
= .11].  
They also tended to rate the Turning Point Memory as more vivid [F(1, 93) = 61.05, p < .001, 
partialη
2 
= .40], coherent [F(1, 93) = 10.96, p = .001, partialη
2 
= .10], accessible [F(1, 93) = 20.07, p 
< .001, partialη
2 
= .18], emotionally intense [F(1, 93) = 20.65, p ≤ .001, partialη
2 
= .18], as having 
more sensory details [F(1, 93) = 17.24, p ≤ .001, partialη
2 
= .16] and a clearer time perspective 
[F(1, 93) = 79.92 , p ≤ .001, partialη
2 
= .46], and as being more likely shared with others [F(1, 93) 
= 15.56, p ≤ .001, partialη
2 
= .14] and retrieved from a first-person visual perspective [F(1, 93) = 
6.86, p = .010, partialη
2 
= .07].  The Turning Point Memory was more likely to be important and 
central to participants’ current self than early memories.  They were also more recent and, 
therefore, it is not surprising that they had higher memory ratings compared to remote memories.   
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Second, to test continuity of memory affect and phenomenology, each of the PANAS and 
MEQ scales were correlated with its respective scale across the two memories (see Table 2 
below).  Although generally positive, the correlations were modest in size.  Positive Affect (but 
not Negative Affect) reported in Turning Point was significantly correlated with Positive Affect 
reported in Childhood Memory (r = .23, p < .05).  Phenomenology dimensions such as Vividness 
(r = .32, p < .01) and Emotional Intensity (r = .47, p < .01) were the most consistent across 
memories, followed by Sensory Details (r = .23, p < .05) and Distancing (r = .27, p < .01).  This 
pattern suggests that dimensions like Vividness or Emotional Intensity were less memory-
specific––i.e. participants with highly vivid and emotional memories may retrieved any given 
memory as visually clear and emotionally charged, regardless of the recency or the type of the 
retrieved event.  The consistency of affect (median correlation = .14) was roughly similar to the 
consistency of phenomenology (median correlation = .13).   
(2) Continuity of affect and phenomenology over time  
Of note, it was common for participants to report a different experience at Time 2 than at 
Time 1: 50.8% of the sample wrote about a different Turning Point and 69.0% wrote about a 
different Childhood Memory.  As such, mean differences between Time 1 and Time 2 were 
tested taking into account whether or not participants wrote about a different experience.  A 2 
(Time: T1 vs. T2) × 2 (Coding: Same vs. Different Memory) repeated measures Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) was performed on memory ratings11.  For the Turning Point Memory, a 
significant effect of Time was found for Vividness [F(1, 58) = 4.05, p = .049, partialη
2 
= .06], 
Coherence [F(1, 58) = 8.01, p = .006, partialη
2 
= .12], Sensory Details [F(1, 58) = 5.41, p = .024, 
                                                     
11
 Only part of the sample reported to had experienced stressful events in the month immediately before 
the beginning of the study (20.2%), or during the time interval (4.8%).  When examining the presence of 
stress as between-subject factor, no main effect of stress or interactive effect of stress with time were 
found on memory ratings.   
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partialη
2 
= .08], and Time Perspective [F(1, 58) = 10.21, p = .002, partialη
2 
= .15]; that is, participants 
showed a slight decrease in the ratings of these scales over time (see Figure 2, section a).  A 
significant time × coding interaction was also found for Accessibility [F(1, 58) = 4.10, p = .047, 
partialη
2 
= .07] and Emotional Intensity [F(1, 58) = 6.07, p = .017, partialη
2 
= .09]:  When a different 
Turning Point was retrieved at Time 2, participants rated their second memory as less accessible 
and less emotionally intense.  For the Childhood Memory, a significant effect of Time was found 
for Emotional Intensity [F(1, 55) = 4.81, p = .033, partialη
2 
= .08]; participants showed a slight 
decrease in the ratings of this scale over time (see Figure 2, section b).  A significant effect of 
coding was found for Time Perspective [F(1, 55) = 7.61, p = .008, partialη
2 
= .12]; that is, those 
who wrote about the same events had a clearer time perspective.  A significant time × coding 
interaction was also found for Distancing [F(1, 55) = 10.15, p = .002, partialη
2 
= .16];  in this case, 
though lower at Time 1, Distancing ratings tended to increase for those who reported the same 
Childhood Memory at Time 2.   
Table 3 shows correlations of affect and phenomenology for each memory over time.  
The test-retest correlations for PANAS and MEQ scales were moderately strong and generally 
significant (median correlation = .39 for Turning Point and = .40 for Childhood Memory), 
especially for those who wrote about the same experience.  Even if the content changed, memory 
affect and phenomenology remained fairly stable over time.  Affect was generally more stable 
than phenomenology.  Of the 10 phenomenology dimensions, Emotional Intensity, Sharing and 
Valence were the most stable over time (rs ≥ 40 for both memory types), followed by Vividness, 
Time Perspective and Distancing (rs ≥ 30 for Turning Point and ≥ 50 for Childhood Memory).   
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Table 2 – Correlations between memory, personality, and outcome variables for the all sample N = 104 
 
Note. N = 99 had Turning Point Memory and N = 94 had Childhood Memory at Time1. Correlations of each of the scales with its respective scale across the two memories are 
reported at the bottom line of the table. The median intercorrelation among MEQ scales was .19 within Turning Point Memory (rs ranged from -.24 to .55) and .21 within 
Childhood Memory (rs ranged from -.29 to .62).   
+ 
p < .10. 
*
 p < .05.  
**
 p < .01.   
 
 
 PA  NA  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Age at event 
type of memory: TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM TP CM 
  Neuroticism (BFI) - .22* - .06   .23* - .02   .04 - .17   .25* - .16 - .10 - .20+   .09 - .08   .16   .19+ - .01 - .27**   .11 -.19+ - .29** -.06   .11   .01 - .25* - .14 - .07 - .10 
  Conscientiousness (BFI)   .36**   .14 - .34**  .10   .22*   .30**   .00   .21*   .11   .08   .13   .28** - .11   .14   .05   .18+   .15 .19+   .36** .12 - .01 - .11   .32** - .01   .11   .04 
  Depression (PHQ-9) - .38** - .09   .36** - .04 - .07 - .18+   .15 - .16 - .10 - .12 - .04 - .06 - .03 - .17 - .26** - .15 - .18+ -.13 - .49** -.15   .06 - .01 - .34** - .14 - .21* - .14 
  Positive Functioning (FS)   .39** - .01 - .36** - .07 - .01   .08 - .09   .12   .23*   .19+   .08   .09 - .02 - .01   .03   .07 - .07 .02   .32** .19+   .02 - .07   .40**   .09   .12 - .04 
  Life Satisfaction (1-item)   .40**   .05 - .41** - .07  .05   .08 - .09   .03   .20*   .14   .03 - .02 - .09   .04   .13   .10   .12 .07   .34** .18+ - .05 - .01   .47**   .18+   .13   .04 
Positive Affect (PA)   1   1 - .42** - .28**  .17+   .39**   .03 - .03   .33**   .25*   .33**   .24*   .22*   .21*   .14   .12   .01  .24*   .42**   .26* - .27** - .19+   .73**   .59**   .27** - .13 
Negative Affect (NA)     1   1  .00   .14 - .02   .26* - .20* - .08 - .02   .30**   .22*   .29** - .03 - .06 - .03 - .00 - .26** - .29**   .11  .10 - .64** - .59** - .16   .05 
1. Vividness       1   1   .51**   .62**   .39**   .45**   .51**   .59**   .37**   .32**   .25*   .29**   .55**   .61**    .35**   .19+ - .20+ - .29**   .06   .21*   .20* - .09 
2. Coherence         1   1   .31**   .34**   .26**   .54**   .23*   .20+   .02   .37**   .40**   .45** - .08 - .06 - .24* - .27** - .03 - .11   .22*   .03 
3. Accessibility           1   1   .21*   .31**   .11   .17 - .02   .25*   .13   .17   .24*   .22* - .16 - .12   .35**   .31**   .21* - .18+ 
4. Sensory Details             1   1   .36**   .34**   .12   .14   .37**   .33**   .18+ - .01 - .20* - .20*   .09   .05   .27** - .08 
5. Emotional Intensity               1   1   .19+ - .11   .25*   .05   .02 - .14 - .05 - .02 - .08   .01   .05 - .08 
6. Visual Perspective                 1   1   .17+  .33**   .25*   .16 - .09 - .24*   .07   .11   .14  .01 
7. Time Perspective                   1   1   .03   .12 - .02 - .15 - .06   .23*   .18 -.01 
8. Sharing                     1   1 - .08 - .16   .39**   .33**   .28** - .18+ 
9. Distancing                       1   1 - .18+ - .04 - .20*   .04 
10. Valence                         1   1   .16 - .02 
rs between memories .23* .06 .32** .05 -.07 .23* .47** .14 .13 .10 .27** .05  
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Figure 2 - Section (a): Estimates marginal means of MEQ scales at Time1 (T1) and Time2 (T2) for Turning Point Memory. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 2 - Section (b): Estimates marginal means of MEQ scales at Time1 (T1) and Time2 (T2) for Childhood Memory. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Table 3 – Correlations of affect and phenomenology in memories over time 
 Turning Point Memory  Childhood Memory 
Dimension Overall Same Different  Overall Same Different 
Positive Affect .52
**
 .77
**
 .19  .40
**
 .75
**
 .29
+
 
Negative Affect .65
**
 .73
**
 .45
*
  .38
**
 .77
**
 .27
+
 
Vividness .32
*
 .63
**
 .22  .50
**
 .79
**
 .41
**
 
Coherence .33
*
 .58
**
 .18  .28
*
 .69
**
 .15 
Accessibility .10 .34
+
 .01  .22 .49
*
 .12 
Sensory Details .40
**
 .39
*
 .41
*
  .33
*
 .58
*
 .29
+
 
Emotional Intensity .47
**
 .72
**
 .27  .43
**
 .66
**
 .38
*
 
Visual Perspective .33
**
 .32
+
 .36
*
  .21 .32 .18 
Time Perspective .34
**
 .71
**
 .12  .61
**
 .84
**
 .42
**
 
Sharing .60
**
 .64
**
 .50
**
  .45
**
 .79
**
 .25 
Distancing .38
**
 .53
**
 .25  .59
**
 .57
*
 .65
**
 
Valence .54
**
 .89
**
 .19  .40
**
 .81
**
 .26 
Sample Size N=61 N=30 N=31  N=58 N=18 N=40 
Note. A total of 61 and 58 participants had respectively valid Turning Point and Childhood Memory at both 
sessions. 
+ 
p < .10. 
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01. 
  
(3) Psychological correlates of memory affect and phenomenology and their changes 
Personality:  Correlations between the personality traits and memory qualities for the 
full sample (N = 104) are shown in Table 2 (see above).  Emotionally stable (low Neuroticism) 
and self-disciplined (high Conscientiousness) individuals tended to report memories that were 
more positive (and less negative) in affect.  For the Turning Point Memory, Neuroticism was 
associated with Coherence (r = .25, p < .05), Sharing (r = -.29, p < .01) and Valence (r = -.25, p 
< .05); specifically, individuals higher in Neuroticism tended to retrieve more specific and 
negative memories, but shared them less with others.  For the Childhood Memory, Neuroticism 
was negatively correlated with Visual Perspective; that is, individual higher in Neuroticism 
tended to retrieve their remote memories from a 3
rd
 person perspective (r = -.27, p < .01).  By 
contrast, Conscientiousness correlated with Vividness (r = .22, p < .05), Sharing (r = .36, p < 
.01) and Valence (r = .32, p < .01) in the Turning Point Memory; individuals higher in 
Conscientiousness tended to report more vivid and positive turning points, and to share them 
more with others.  Conscientiousness was also associated with Vividness (r = .30, p < .01), 
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Coherence (r =. 21, p < .05), and Sensory Details (r = .28, p < .01) in the Childhood Memory; 
that is, individual higher in Conscientiousness tended to rate their early memories as more vivid 
and coherent, and rich of sensory details.   
To test whether personality was associated with change in affect and phenomenology 
over time, each personality trait was correlated with residual change scores, computed by 
predicting the Time 2 memory ratings from the corresponding Time 1 ratings and saving the 
residuals.  For the Turning Point Memory, Conscientiousness was associated with change in 
Distancing (r = -.28, p < .05), which indicated that individuals low in Conscientiousness tended 
to progressively distance themselves from their life-changing experiences.  For the Childhood 
Memory, individual high in Neuroticism tended to report less Accessibility (r = -.29, p < .05), 
Sharing (r = -.27, p < .05) and Valence (r = -.29, p < .05) in their second memories than in their 
first memories.  That is, over time, the childhood memory of participants high in Neuroticism 
became less accessible, less shared, and more negative.  By contrast, individual high in 
Conscientiousness tended to report a more positive Valence (r = .30, p < .05) in their second 
Childhood Memory.  There were no other significant correlations between the residual change 
scores and Neuroticism and Conscientiousness.  Whether or not the memory reported at Time 2 
was different from the memory reported at Time 1 did not moderate any of these effects.   
Psychological outcomes: In the present sample, the memory variables were mostly 
unrelated to the measures of depression, positive functioning and life satisfaction.   Participants 
with high levels of depressive symptoms tended to rate their Turning Point Memory (but not 
their Childhood Memory) as likely to be retrieved from a 3rd person visual perspective (r = -.26, 
p < .01), as negatively valanced (r = -.34, p < .01), and less frequently shared with others (r = -
.49, p < .01). By contrast, participants with high scores on positive functioning and life 
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satisfaction rated their Turning Point Memory as high in Accessibility (r = .23 and .20, ps < .05), 
Sharing (r = .32 and .34, ps < .01) and Valence (r = .40 and .47, ps < .01). 
To test whether changes in phenomenology were associated with changes in both 
depression and overall well-being, change scores of memory ratings were correlated with the 
residual change scores of each of the psychological outcomes.  Increases in depressive symptoms 
over time was associated with decreases in Positive Affect (r = -.33, p < .01) and Valence (r = -
.31, p < .05) for the Turning Point Memory only, whereas increases in positive functioning and 
life satisfaction was associated with increases in Positive Affect (rs ~ .30, ps < .05) only for the 
Childhood Memory.   
Did phenomenology mediate the effect of personality on outcome variables? 
Bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) were applied to test whether 
memory phenomenology (and its changes) mediated the effect of personality measured at Time 1 
on each of the positive/negative psychological outcomes measured at Time 2.  As such, 
Personality scores at Time 1 (Neuroticism or Conscientiousness) were used as predictors, 
phenomenology scores at Time 1 (or phenomenology change scores) were used as mediators, 
and outcome variables of interest (depression, positive functioning or life satisfaction) were used 
as criterion (controlling Time 1 criterion data).  Bootstrap results for the indirect effects showed 
that none fell in the 95% confidence intervals.  Thus, phenomenology (or its changes) did not 
mediate personality association with depression, positive functioning or life satisfaction.   
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Discussion 
Applying a longitudinal design, the present study examined the continuity of affect and 
phenomenology in two personal meaningful memories, a Turning Point Memory and a 
Childhood Memory.  Overall, there was moderate continuity in memory ratings over a 40 days 
interval, at levels comparable to what was found in previous studies (Rubin et al., 2004; Sutin & 
Robins, 2005).  The median test-retest coefficients were ~ .40 for both memory types, although 
higher correlations were observed when participants wrote about the same experiences (i.e. 
median r .68 for same event and .27 for different events).  Even though mean-level changes were 
observed, dimensions like Vividness, Emotional Intensity, and Distancing were consistent across 
memories and over time.  The present findings suggest that stable aspects of psychological 
functioning may shape the affective and phenomenological experience of autobiographical 
memory.   
To date, relatively few studies have investigated the association between personality 
traits, such as Neuroticism and Conscientiousness, and memory phenomenology (though 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2010; Rubin & Siegler, 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2010).  And, none 
correlated these personality traits with phenomenology changes.  In the present sample, 
Neuroticism, which includes facets of Anxiety and Depression, was associated with more 
specific and negative turning point memories, which were also rarely shared with others.  
Although anxiety and depression are in general associated with impoverished memory (Sumner, 
2012; Witheridge et al., 2010), specific negative information may be easily accessible to 
individuals high in Neuroticism at non-clinical levels of anxious-depressive symptoms.   
However, given the use of unconstrained memory requests, it is not possible to test whether these 
associations were moderated by specific memory valence or domain.  On the other hand, 
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Conscientiousness was related to having more vivid and coherent memories in general (Sutin, 
2008), and more positive and frequently shared Turning Point Memory, but not Childhood 
Memory, in particular.  Contrary to expectations, only few phenomenological dimensions (i.e. 
Visual Perspective but not Coherence) showed significant correlations with psychological 
outcomes (i.e. depression).  Moreover, though the need for more research, the present findings 
tentatively suggested that phenomenology changes over time are based on underlining individual 
differences.   
Although a causal link cannot be drawn, autobiographical memory phenomenology was 
proposed as one dynamic process that translates basic tendencies (personality) into characteristic 
adaptations.  For example, an individual high in Neuroticism (or low in Conscientiousness) may 
evaluate his/her current life satisfaction based on the subjective experience of his/her most 
meaningful memories.  The degree to which he/she perceives such memories as distant from 
him/herself likely determines the degree to which he/she feels satisfied with life (Sutin, 2008).  
However, in the present sample, phenomenology (and its changes) was not a significant mediator 
of the longitudinal effects of personality on positive/negative outcome variables.  Nevertheless, 
memory phenomenology remains an important aspect of the individual functioning.  
Autobiographical memory has been an object of successful interventions for the reduction of 
depressive-anxious symptoms (Dalgleish et al., 2014; Moradi et al., 2014) and has been 
identified as one of the mechanisms that underling long-term changes in personality dispositions 
(Sutin & Robins, 2005).   
As noted before, the majority of participants chose to write about a different event at 
Time 2.  When examining specific types of memories over time (e.g. ‘earliest’ memories), some 
studies reported high consistency in the events selected across sections (Jack & Hayne, 2010).   
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Individuals tended to identify the same experience as a key event, even after several years (Bauer 
et al., 2014; Leonard & Burn, 2006).  However, other studies showed low consistency in event 
reports over time (McAdams et al., 2006; Sutin & Robins, 2005; Thorne et al., 1998), especially 
at detailed levels of analyses (e.g. information on location, activities, etc.; Drivdahl & Hyman, 
2014).  Nevertheless, these studies indicated relatively continuity in the emotional tone and 
motivational themes of the memories.  The present work expands continuity to phenomenology 
ratings:  Though content changes quickly, phenomenology remains relatively stable.  In fact, one 
possible explanation of the high percentage of ‘different events’ reported at Time 2 may be 
related to participants’ young age.  Young adults may be especially open to variation and re-
interpretation of their life story compared to older adults (McAdams & Olson, 2010).   
 A number of limitations need to be taken into account in interpreting the present 
findings.  First, a significant drop-out of participants was observed at Time 2.  Thus, only a part 
of the sample was tested longitudinally.  Second, the alpha reliability of Accessibility, Sensory 
Detail and Time Perspective scales was poor for Turning Point Memory.  Although they were 
retained (see Footnote 10 for details), caution is needed in interpreting the results for these 
scales.  Third, the question of continuity was assessed only for Turning Point and Childhood 
Memory, but additional key events (e.g. low point, high point, etc.) can be of particular interest 
to study.  Fourth, the sample was composed of non-clinical participants aged 20-40.  Given that 
life story evolves over time, future studies should examine memory continuity in different age 
groups, combining self-report ratings with measurements of memory narrative (and content), and 
varying time-intervals between sessions.  Moreover, given that memory phenomenology is 
particularly important in the clinical domain, further insights should be also obtained by 
examining memory continuity in clinical populations.  
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General Discussion 
The phenomenology of a memory is what brings a past experience back to life during 
retrieval (Sutin & Robins, 2007; Tulving, 2002).  Memory phenomenology has been linked to 
underlying stable dispositions—i.e. personality (Singer & Salovey, 1993), as well as to a variety 
of psychological outcomes.  A cross-sectional and a longitudinal study were conducted on a 
large sample of American and Italian adults.  In both studies, participants retrieved two ‘key’ 
personal memories, a Turning Point and a Childhood Memory, and rated the affect and 
phenomenology of each memory.  Participants also completed self-reported measures of 
personality (i.e. Neuroticism and Conscientiousness) and measures of depression, well-being and 
life satisfaction.  The present research found that phenomenological ratings tend (a) to show 
cross-sectional, age-related increases across adulthood (Study 1) and (b) to be moderately stable 
over time, regardless of memory content (Study 2).  Interrelations among memory 
phenomenology, personality and psychological outcomes were also examined (Study 1 and 
Study 2).  In particular, autobiographical memory phenomenology was proposed as a dynamic 
expression of personality functioning that partially explains adaptive/maladaptive psychological 
outcomes. The findings partially supported the hypothesized mediating effect of phenomenology 
on the personality association with psychological outcomes.  The implications of each of these 
findings are discussed below.   
 
Phenomenology across the adult lifespan 
Contrary to the majority of studies that have compared small groups of young and old 
adults, Study 1 explored age differences in autobiographical memory in a large, stratified sample 
of Americans (N = 1,075) representing the adult lifespan (age range = 20–87).  Applying the 
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MEQ, the study considered not just one memory dimension but the full-range of 
phenomenological experiences, with evidence of both linear and nonlinear trends in the memory 
ratings across adulthood.  Although several studies have reported deficits in episodic retrieval in 
older adults (e.g., Piolino et al., 2010; Piolino et al., 2006), others have observed a linear increase 
in phenomenological ratings across age (e.g., Janssen et al., 2011; Kingo et al., 2013).  Study 1 
replicated this latter finding: Most of the phenomenology dimensions (e.g., Vividness) tended to 
increase cross-sectionally between early and middle adulthood, till later ages.  There was also a 
significant quadratic effect for Accessibility (p < .05 for both memories) and Emotional Intensity 
(p < .10 and p < .05 for Turning Point and Childhood Memory, respectively), and approached 
significance for Coherence (p < .10 for Childhood Memory only) and Sensory Details (p < .10 
for Turning Point Memory only). This pattern suggests that older adults had memories that were 
more vivid, coherent, temporally clear than younger adults, but also memories that were slightly 
less accessible and detailed. Of note, though small in size (highest β = .18 for Coherence), age 
effects on phenomenology were not accounted by other factors, i.e. the recency of the memory 
itself.   
The findings may represent a real difference between the amount of recollection or a 
general tendency for older adults to rate many dimensions as higher (as suggested by Janssen et 
al., 2011).  Still, it may represent preservation of important autobiographical memories over the 
lifespan; older adults still have well-rehearsed and phenomenologically-rich memories on which 
to rely on in time of need (Singer et al., 2007). It would be interesting to expand this line of 
research by combining rating scales with other measures of memory phenomenology––e.g., the 
coding vividness, coherence, and so on, directly from narratives of the memory. Detailed 
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recollections, as judged by the individual and others, may contribute to individuals’ overall well-
being, especially in later ages (e.g., Latorre et al., 2013). 
The observed differences in phenomenology seem to reflect the progressive integration of 
memories into participants’ life stories. Individuals may need time to comprehend the 
importance of past experiences, to relate and to integrate them with other important life 
moments. This process indeed extends through emerging adulthood into middle- and old-ages 
(McAdams & Olson, 2010), and may have an effect on memory phenomenology as individuals 
advance in age (Montebarocci et al., 2014). For instance, in Study 1, older participants rated their 
memories as more coherent and less distanced from their current self than younger adults.  When 
examining life narratives, indeed, it has been observed a striving for meaning during early 
adulthood (Habermas et al., 2013).  For younger adults, autobiographical stories appear to 
provide a means for self-exploration and self-understanding, while, for older adults, they appear 
to provide a means for stability (and coherence) (McLean, 2008).  
 
Phenomenology continuity (and changes) over time 
Applying a longitudinal design, Study 2 examined the continuity of memory 
phenomenology in a sample of Italians adults aged 20-40 years (N = 104).  While the majority of 
the existing works focused on consistency or accuracy of memory accounts, fewer studies 
explored longitudinally the subjective experience of self-relevant memories.  Replicating 
previous findings (Rubin et al., 2004; Sutin & Robins, 2005), Study 2 showed moderate 
continuity in memory ratings over the 4-week interval, even if the majority of participants 
choose to recall a different Turning Point and Childhood Memory at follow-up. Specifically, 
test-retest coefficients of MEQ scales had a median of about .40. Even though mean-level 
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changes were observed, dimensions like Vividness, Emotional Intensity, and Distancing were 
consistent across memories and over time.  
These findings suggest that stable individual differences may shape the retrieval of 
memories. Indeed, Neuroticism and Conscientiousness were associated with some of the 
phenomenological dimensions and changes in phenomenology over time. For example, 
participants low in Conscientiousness tended to distance more from their past experiences at 
follow-up. These individuals may find difficult to integrate their turning-point experience, 
lacking of self-coherence. A longer follow-up (i.e. years), however, is needed to explore both 
memory and personality changes and their reciprocal relation. 
Individuals may identify the same experience as a key event even after several years 
(Leonard & Burn, 2006) or choose different events as the most meaningful (McAdams et al., 
2006).  Over the short follow-up interval in Study 2, participants were just as likely to retrieve a 
memory of a different event as the same one. Despite the change in memory content, the 
phenomenology ratings remained relatively stable.  From a clinical perspective, the question of 
consistency/continuity of autobiographical memory is of particular importance.  Does stability 
vs. change in memory qualities determine long-term positive/negative adaptations? The present 
research suggests that the answer is no, since phenomenology was unrelated to changes in the 
psychological outcomes. The high re-test correlation for these outcomes indicates stability (see 
Appendix C), which limits the ability to predict change. Further studies are needed to test 
whether memory continuity varies as a function of participants’ characteristics––i.e., by 
considering different age groups, not only young adults––and clinical conditions (e.g. 
depression), and over a longer period of time.   
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Phenomenology mediates personality and characteristic adaptations  
Autobiographical memory phenomenology was proposed as one dynamic process that 
translates basic tendencies (personality) into characteristic adaptations. In other words, 
autobiographical memory may be a dynamic expression of personality functioning that 
potentially explains the association between the traits and psychological outcomes.  Sutin (2008) 
found phenomenology to mediate well-established relations between Neuroticism and subjective 
health, and between Conscientiousness and achievement-related strivings.  The present research 
expanded previous work by: (1) considering different types of characteristic adaptations as 
outcomes (i.e. current depressive symptoms, overall well-being and life satisfaction), and (2) 
applying both a cross-sectional (Study 1) and a longitudinal design (Study 2).  
Only Study 1 provided support for the proposed mechanism. Specifically, in Study 1, 
coherence and memory affect partially mediated the personality-depression association: 
Individuals high in Neuroticism and low in Conscientiousness experienced more depressive 
symptoms, in part, because they mainly relied on incoherent and affectively negative memories. 
Individuals high in Neuroticism also had lower levels of well-being in part because they tended 
to distance themselves from their past experiences, while conscientious individuals tended to 
report more phenomenologically intense and affectively positive memories, which enhanced 
their sense of well-being and life satisfaction. However, when using a longitudinal design (Study 
2), none of the phenomenological dimensions mediated the effect of personality on the 
psychological outcome variables.  Of note, Study 1 and Study 2 differ in sample size, 
composition, and cultural background; a larger sample may have provided the power needed to 
detect mediating effects as in Study 1. Mediating effects are expected to be modest in size, as 
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found in Study 1 (maximum Δβ = .06), such as other variables may intervene in predicting 
positive vs. negative adaptations over time. 
A further consideration regards causality (and the direction of causality). For instance, 
individuals high in Neuroticism (or low Conscientiousness) may have dim or fragmented 
memories because they have higher levels of depressive symptoms (or lower well-being). It is 
not possible to disentangle whether the way memories are recalled exacerbates depression or 
whether higher levels of depression disrupt memory construction.  Still, autobiographical 
memory and personality reciprocally influence each other: Trait dispositions likely shape 
memory content, and influence the interpretation of past events, which in turn are aspects 
potentially implicated in personality development and change over time (Sutin et al., 2010; Sutin 
& Robins, 2005).   
Still, phenomenology remains an important aspect of autobiographical memory to be 
explored. The relation between personality and the experience of autobiographical memory may 
shed light on how individuals construe life story memories, and how the story they tell promotes 
social-emotional adjustment, psychological growth and wisdom (Blagov & Singer, 2004). 
However, additional longitudinal studies are needed to clarify the interrelation between memory, 
personality and psychological health. 
 
Clinical implications 
Present findings corroborate the importance of specific memory dimensions, such as 
specificity/coherence, in determining positive/negative adaptations. As highlighted by McAdams 
(2006b), construing a coherent story contributes to psychological health. Individuals who are 
able to meaningfully connect their past experiences can use those experiences to understand 
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themselves, or tell others about them, increasing a sense of self-continuity. Phenomenologically-
rich memories serve positive functions: They support individuals’ goal pursuits, helping them to 
plan future behaviors (Blagov & Singer, 2004). Conversely, a lack of specificity/coherence in 
memory characterizes many clinical conditions, such as depression and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (e.g., Boelen et al., 2014; Sumner et al., 2013). Although the retrieval of vague 
memories may reduce the emotional impact of an event, ultimately it may lead to greater 
psychological distress by hindering memory positive functions.  
Autobiographical memories represent a window into the psychological functioning of the 
individual and constitute the daily material to work on during clinical interactions (Singer & 
Bonalume, 2010; Singer & Conway, 2011). Both researchers and clinical practitioners have 
identified practice of autobiographical recollection as a useful tool in psychotherapy. For 
example, writing about a negative (potentially traumatic) event has been found to have beneficial 
effects (Pennebaker, 1997). In fact, Rubin, Boals, and Klein (2010) suggested that only the act of 
retrieving and rating (thinking about) a stressful memory leads to significant reductions in event-
related distress; the repeated reliving of the event in a safe environment leads to a reduction of 
negative valence, emotional intensity and availability of the memory (Rubin et al., 2010). More 
recently, group-based intervention programs have been developed to alleviate depressive 
symtomatology by intervening on depression-related memory difficulties (e.g., MEST; Dalgleish 
et al., 2014; Reas et al., 2009). There is also increasing evidence of the efficacy of Life 
Review/reminiscence interventions in alleviating depression symptoms and enhancing life 
satisfaction in the elderly (Latorre et al., 2015; Serrano et al., 2004). 
However, further studies are needed to identify the mechanisms behind the utility of such 
therapeutic approaches (Dalgleish et al., 2014; Sloan & Marx, 2004). A deeper understanding of 
Discussion 
92 
 
autobiographical memory processes, and their relations with personality and positive/negative 
outcome variables, would help to design more effective interventions.   
 
Limitations and future directions 
The present research suggests a number of possibilities for future studies.  First, only two 
memories were sampled here.  Other ‘key’ events (e.g. low point, high point, etc.) in addition to 
Turning Point and Childhood Memory should be also collected in future work.  It is also worth 
noting that the present studies did not constrain subjects for the valence, or the domain, (e.g., 
work, love, etc.) of memories.  In particular, in explaining the relation between personality and 
psychological outcomes, positive vs. negative events may have different weight.  For example, 
individuals higher in neuroticism may have higher levels of depressive symptoms because they 
have more incoherent or fragmented positive (both not negative) memories.  Again, individuals 
higher in conscientiousness may have higher levels of well-being because they have more 
coherent and detailed positive (but not negative) memories.  Moreover, the interrelation between 
personality, memory and outcome variables is likely influenced by how central the event is to 
participants’ life story and identity (e.g., Berntsen & Rubin, 2007).  All these aspect need to be 
explored in further studies.   
Second, as noted above, the current research focused exclusively on self-report data.  
Self-ratings of memory phenomenology require participants to first produce the memory and 
then to reflect on the memory and rate it.  As such, participants engage in two separate 
(consecutive) cognitive tasks.  An alternative way would be to directly code affect and 
phenomenology from the memory itself.  Few works have combined subjective and objective 
ratings of memory characteristics (though see e.g., Rubin, 2011; Sumner et al., 2013).  Waters et 
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al. (2013) found that positive and negative memories did not differ in either narrative quality or 
subjective ratings, when controlling for retention interval and emotional intensity.  Similar 
results were obtained by Rubin (2011).  However, other studies found no correlations between 
questionnaire and narrative measures (e.g., Bohanek, Fivush, & Walker, 2005).  As such, 
different approaches may tap different aspects of memory quality (as suggested by Waters et al., 
2013).  Both self-report questionnaires and narrative measures may provide unique information 
about how participants understand and experience their most important memories.  It would also 
be informative to examine the contents (themes) of memories, as coded by independent 
observers.   
Third, there is a need for additional longitudinal studies.  Existing work focused mainly 
on the consistency or accuracy of the memory content, partially neglecting other important 
memory components.  It would be interesting to extend Study 2 to examine continuity (and 
change) in autobiographical memory in different age groups, and varying time-intervals between 
sessions: Are older participants more stable than younger participants?  How would the 
trajectory change over longer time intervals?   
Lastly, the present findings are based on non-clinical samples, but memory 
phenomenology is particularly important in the clinical domain.  Memory phenomenology has 
been associated with distress symptoms in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Rubin et al., 
2008; Sutin & Gillath, 2009), but several questions are still open: What is the longitudinal 
trajectory of phenomenology in clinical samples? Are individuals with clinically relevant 
symptoms more or less stable than individuals with low levels of symptoms?
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APPENDIX A 
Memory Requests 
Turning Point [ENGLISH] – In looking back over your life, it may be possible to identify 
certain key moments that stand out as turning points – episodes that marked an important change 
in you or your life story. Please identify a particular episode in your life story that you now see 
as a turning point in your life. If you cannot identify a key turning point that stands out clearly, 
please describe some event in your life wherein you went through an important change of some 
kind. Please describe what happened, where and when, who was involved, and what you were 
thinking and feeling.  
Turning Point [ITALIAN] – Guardando indietro nel corso della tua vita, è possibile identificare 
alcuni momenti chiave che rappresentano dei “punti di svolta” – episodi che hanno 
contrassegnato un cambiamento importante in te o nella tua storia di vita. Per favore identifica un 
episodio particolare che vedi ad oggi come un “punto di svolta” nella tua vita. Se non riesci ad 
identificare un punto di svolta che spicca chiaramente, descrivi per favore un evento in cui hai 
affrontato un cambiamento importante di qualche tipo. Descrivi cosa avvenne, dove e quando, 
con chi ti trovavi, cosa pensavi e come ti sentivi in quel momento.  
 
 
 
Childhood Memory [ENGLISH] – Think about an event from your early childhood that stands 
out in some way. Please describe this event in detail. What happened, where and when, who was 
involved, and what were you thinking and feeling?  
Childhood Memory [ITALIAN] – Pensa ad un evento per te particolarmente importante che 
risale alla tua infanzia. Descrivi per favore il ricordo in dettaglio. Cosa avvenne, dove e quando, 
con chi ti trovavi, cosa pensavi e come ti sentivi in quel momento? 
 
 
 
Memory Requests used in Study 1 were adapted from the ‘key scenes’ instructions of the Life 
Story Interview (McAdams, 2008). The Italian version of these requests was obtained using the 
standard translation/back-translation method and used in Study 2. 
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Memory Experiences Questionnaires (MEQ) 
English Version 
 
VIVIDNESS 
1. My memory for this event is clear 
2. My memory for this event is very vivid * 
3. My memory for this event is very detailed * 
4. My memory for this event is dim (R) * 
5. My memory for this event is very vague (R) 
6. My memory for this event is sketchy (R) 
 
COHERENCE  
1. The order of events in the memory is clear * 
2. When I recall this memory, the sequence of events seems realistic 
3. This memory is of an event that occurred once at a particular time and place, not a 
summary or merging of many similar or related events * 
4. I recognize the setting in which my memory takes place 
5. The order of events in the memory is confusing (R) 
6. This memory comes back to me in bits and pieces, not as a logical, coherent story (R) * 
7.  This memory is a blending of many similar, related events rather than a specific memory 
about a particular event (R) * 
8. I have a difficult time remembering the event in a coherent manner (R) 
 
ACCESSIBILITY 
1. This memory just sprang to my mind when I read the instructions 
2. This memory was easy for me to recall * 
3. It was difficult for me to think of this memory (R) * 
4. I had to think for a while before I could recall this event (R) * 
5. I really had to search my ‘‘memory bank’’ for this experience (R) 
 
SENSORY DETAILS  
1. As I remember the event, I can hear it in my mind * 
2. As I remember the event, I can feel now the emotions that I felt then 
3. I can bodily ‘‘feel’’ myself in this memory  
4. When I recall this event, I think the same things I thought when the event originally 
happened * 
5. When I recall this memory, I do not feel the same feelings I felt when the event originally 
happened (R) 
6. When I recall this event, it does not really feel like I am reliving the experience (R) 
7. My memory for this event does not involve a lot of sensory information (sounds, smells, 
tastes, etc.) (R) * 
8. As I remember the event, I have a difficult time recalling the particular physical reactions 
and sensations I had during the experience (R) * 
 
EMOTIONAL INTENSITY  
1. As I am remembering the experience now, my feelings are very intense 
2. My emotions are very intense concerning this event * 
3. The memory of this event evokes powerful emotions * 
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4. I do not remember having particularly strong emotions at the time of this event (R) 
5. I do not have strong emotions about this memory (R) 
6. This memory does not evoke strong emotions in me (R) * 
 
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. I see the experience in the memory through my own eyes  
2. In my memory, I see this experience through my own eyes * 
3. When I visualize this memory, I clearly see this event from my own perspective 
4. I view this memory as if I was an observer to the experience (R) * 
5. In my memory, I see this experience through the eyes of others (R) 
6. As I remember this event, I feel like an observer watching myself (R) * 
 
TIME PERSPECTIVE 
1. My memory for the year when the event took place is clear 
2. My memory for the day when the event took place is clear * 
3. My memory for the hour when the event took place is clear * 
4. My memory for the year when the event took place is vague (R) * 
5. My memory for the day when the event took place is vague (R) 
6. My memory for the hour when the event took place is vague (R) 
 
SHARING 
1. I often share this memory with friends or family 
2. Since it happened, I have talked about this event many times * 
3. I frequently think about or talk about this event with others * 
4. I rarely tell others about this memory (R) * 
5. I do not feel the need to share this memory with others (R) 
6. I do not think about this memory often (R) 
 
DISTANCING 
1. I don’t have much in common with the person in the memory 
2. I feel like the person in this memory is a different person than who I am today * 
3. When I recall this memory, I think, ‘‘that’s not me anymore’’ * 
4. My behavior in this memory is consistent with my personality (R) 
5. I feel like I am the same person in the memory as I am today (R) * 
6. This memory is consistent with who I think I am today (R) 
 
VALENCE 
1. The overall tone of the memory is positive * 
2. The experience described in this memory is positive 
3. My feelings at the time were positive 
4. The overall tone of the memory is negative (R) * 
5. The experience described in this memory is negative (R) 
6. My feelings at the time were negative (R) 
 
(R) = Reverse-scored item 
* Included in the short-form of MEQ 
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Memory Experiences Questionnaires (MEQ) 
Italian Version 
 
VIVIDEZZA 
1. Il mio ricordo di questo evento è chiaro 
2. Il mio ricordo di questo evento è molto vivido * 
3. Il mio ricordo di questo evento è molto dettagliato * 
4. Il mio ricordo di questo evento è offuscato (R) * 
5. ll mio ricordo di questo evento è molto vago (R) 
6. ll mio ricordo di questo evento è approssimativo (R) 
 
COERENZA 
1. L'ordine degli eventi nel ricordo è chiaro * 
2. Quando richiamo alla mente questo ricordo, la sequenza degli eventi sembra realistica  
3. Questo ricordo è di un evento che accadde in un preciso momento  e luogo, non un insieme 
sommario di molti eventi simili o collegati * 
4. Riconosco il contesto nel quale si svolse l'evento  
5. Nel ricordo l'ordine degli eventi è confuso (R) 
6. Questo ricordo mi sovviene in frammenti, non come una storia coerente e logica (R) * 
7.  Questo ricordo è una miscela di molti eventi simili e collegati piuttosto che un ricordo 
specifico di un particolare evento (R) * 
8. Ho difficoltà nel ricordare l'evento in modo coerente (R) 
 
ACCESSIBILITA’ 
1. Questo ricordo mi è venuto in mente appena ho letto le istruzioni  
2. Mi è stato facile richiamare alla mente questo ricordo * 
3. E' stato difficile per me pensare a questo ricordo (R) * 
4. Ho dovuto pensarci un po' prima di riuscire a ricordare questo evento (R) * 
5. Ho dovuto veramente cercare nei recessi della mia memoria per recuperare questa 
esperienza (R) 
 
DETTAGLI SENSORIALI 
1. Mentre ricordo questo evento, posso udirlo nella mia mente 
2. Mentre ricordo questo evento, riesco a rivivere le emozioni che provai allora 
3. Riesco a sentirmi in senso fisico in questo ricordo * 
4. Quando richiamo alla mente questo evento, penso le stesse cose che pensai quando 
l'evento capitò originariamente * 
5. Quando richiamo alla mente questo ricordo, non provo le stesse emozioni che provai 
quando accadde originariamente (R) 
6. Quando richiamo alla mente questo evento, non è proprio come se stessi rivivendo la 
stessa esperienza (R) 
7. Il mio ricordo di questo evento non include molte informazioni sensoriali (suoni, odori, 
sapori, ...) (R) * 
8. Mentre ricordo l’evento, ho difficoltà nel richiamare le particolari reazioni e sensazioni 
fisiche provate durante l’esperienza (R) * 
 
INTENSITA’ EMOTIVA 
1. Mentre ricordo l'esperienza adesso, le mie emozioni sono molto intense 
2. Le mie emozioni riguardo questo evento sono molto intense * 
 129 
 
3. Il ricordo di questo evento mi evoca emozioni forti * 
4. Non mi ricordo di aver provato emozioni particolarmente intense al tempo dell’evento (R) 
5. Non provo forti emozioni rispetto a questo ricordo (R) 
6. Questo ricordo non evoca forti emozioni in me (R) * 
 
PROSPETTIVA VISIVA 
1. Vedo l'esperienza nel ricordo attraverso i miei stessi occhi  
2. Nel ricordo, vedo questa esperienza attraverso i miei stessi occhi * 
3. Quando visualizzo nella mia mente questo ricordo, vedo chiaramente questo evento dalla 
mia prospettiva  
4. Vedo questo ricordo come se fossi un osservatore esterno dell’evento (R) * 
5. Nel mio ricordo, rivedo l’esperienza come attraverso gli occhi di altre persone (R) 
6. Mentre ricordo questo evento, mi sento come un osservatore esterno che osserva me stesso 
(R) * 
 
PROSPETTIVA TEMPORALE 
1. Ricordo chiaramente l'anno in cui si verificò questo evento 
2. Ricordo chiaramente il giorno in cui si verificò questo evento * 
3. Ricordo chiaramente l'ora in cui si verificò questo evento * 
4.Ricordo solo vagamente in che anno si verificò l’evento (R) * 
5. Ho un ricordo vago del giorno in cui si verificò l'evento (R) 
6. Ho un ricordo vago dell'ora in cui si verificò l'evento (R) 
 
CONDIVISIONE 
1. Condivido spesso questo ricordo con amici o parenti  
2. Da quando è accaduto, ho parlato di questo evento molte volte  
3. Penso o parlo frequentemente di questo evento con gli altri * 
4. Racconto raramente agli altri questo ricordo (R) * 
5. Non sento il bisogno di condividere questo ricordo con gli altri (R) 
6. Non penso spesso a questo ricordo (R) 
 
DISTANZIAMENTO 
1. Non ho molto in comune con la persona nel ricordo 
2. Sento come se la persona nel ricordo fosse una persona diversa da quella che sono io oggi* 
3. Quando richiamo alla mente questo ricordo, penso “non sono più quella persona” * 
4. Il mio comportamento in questo ricordo è compatibile con la mia personalità (R)  
5. Ad oggi, mi sento di essere la stessa persona che ero all’epoca del ricordo (R) * 
6. Questo ricordo è compatibile con chi penso di essere oggi (R) 
 
VALENZA 
1. Il tono generale del ricordo è positivo * 
2. L'esperienza descritta in questo ricordo è positiva 
3. Le mie emozioni di allora erano positive 
4. Il tono generale del ricordo è negativo (R) * 
5. L'esperienza descritta nel ricordo è negativa (R) 
5. Le mie emozioni a quel tempo erano negative (R) 
 
(R) = Reverse-scored item 
* Included in the short-form of MEQ 
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APPENDIX B 
Supplementary Material of Study 1 
 
 
(a) Turning Point Memory 
 
 
(b) Childhood Memory 
 
Figure S1: Age at the time of event. Section (a) refers to 
Turning Point events (N = 1,052), section (b) refers to 
Childhood events (N = 999). 
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Table S1 – Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among all variables for each age group 
 
M (SD)   N   C   PHQ-9   FS   LS   PA   NA   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
20-29 years 
                   
Neuroticism (N) 2.95(0.8)   . - .45**   .47** - .43** - .43** - .29**   .15* - .18* - .18* - .18* - .25**   .01 - .03 - .24** - .14*   .18*  - .19** 
Conscientiousness (C) 3.65(0.6) - .45**   . - .46**   .52**   .28**   .19** - .10   .31**   .20**   .32**   .15*   .17*   .06   .26**   .01 - .04   .12 
Depression (PHQ-9) 8.17(7.2)   .47** -.46**   . - .22** - .11 - .13   .29** - .34** - .29** - .36** - .24** - .10 - .22** - .24** - .09   .08 - .17* 
Positive Functioning (FS) 3.96(0.8) - .43**   .52** - .22**   .   .65**   .35** - .08   .35**   .15*   .18*   .30**   .24**   .02   .28**   .16*   .00   .18* 
Life Satisfaction (LS) 3.79(1.1) - .43**   .28** - .11   .65**   .   .32**   .03   .18*   .01 - .03   .23**   .10 - .04   .19**   .18* - .04   .13 
Positive Affect (PA) 3.16(1.3)/2.54(1.3) - .17*   .04   .04   .14   .09   . - .24**   .24**   .09   .22**   .25**   .01   .08   .36**   .41** - .19**   .71** 
Negative Affect (NA) 2.24(1.0)/2.10(1.1)   .11 - .16*   .31** - .14   .07 - .24**   . - .17* - .21** - .36** - .06   .15* - .21** - .23** - .19**   .23** - .47** 
1. Vividness 3.88(0.8)/3.55(0.9) - .07   .22** - .10   .19*   .13   .09   .08   .   .43**   .47**   .53**   .33**   .30**   .62**   .22** - .09   .21** 
2. Coherence 3.56(0.8)/3.57(0.9) - .07   .28** - .21**   .20**   .07 - .18* - .13   .47**   .   .49**   .35**   .25**   .31**   .44** - .01 - .04   .11 
3. Accessibility 3.96(0.9)/3.80(0.9)   .00   .25** - .25**   .16*   .01 - .04 - .25**   .52**   .51**   .   .30**   .22**   .32**   .51**   .23** - .09   .42** 
4. Sensory Details 3.44(0.7)/3.20(0.7) - .07   .09 - .06   .19*   .15*   .12   .05   .58**   .37**   .40** .   .38**   .16*   .56**   .22** - .12   .19** 
5. Emotional Intensity 3.68(0.9)/3.21(1.0)   .13   .12   .06   .05 - .01   .13   .25**   .42**   .18*   .11 .42**   .   .09   .35** - .06   .11 - .06 
6. Visual Perspective 3.31(0.9)/3.13(0.9)   .13   .10 - .08 - .09 - .13 - .15* - .07   .21**   .24**   .18* .15*   .13   .   .22** - .01 - .11   .21** 
7. Time Perspective 3.71(0.9)/3.20(0.9) - .10   .12   .01   .10   .11   .18*   .14   .55**   .24**   .27** .58**   .36**   .01   .   .19** - .08   .31** 
8. Sharing 3.08(1.1)/2.69(1.0) - .14 - .05 - .00   .13   .13   .30**   .06   .24** - .09   .00 .23**   .12 - .23**   .21**   . - .21**   .41** 
9. Distancing 3.31(1.0)/3.30(1.0)   .20**   .03   .11 - .02 - .13 - .22**   .11 - .11 - .09 - .08 -.16*   .01   .04 - .09 - .13   . - .18* 
10. Valence 3.46(1.3)/3.28(1.4) - .16*   .03 - .19*   .10 - .02   .61** - .61** - .13 - .10   .09 .01 - .18* - .04 - .01   .10 - .22**   . 
30-39 years 
                   
Neuroticism (N) 2.87(0.8)   . - .41
**   .52** - .45** - .41** - .39**   .39** - .09 - .11 - .17* - .14*   .04 - .03 - .14   .02   .11 - .30** 
Conscientiousness (C) 3.77(0.6) - .41
**   . - .44**   .41**   .16*   .09 - .24**   .34**   .31**   .41**   .33**   .26**   .06   .32**   .03   .03   .17* 
Depression (PHQ-9) 7.96(7.5)   .52
** - .44**   . - .17** - .21** - .15*   .40** - .13 - .18* - .30** - .17*   .06 - .05 - .09   .10   .12 - .27** 
Positive Functioning (FS) 3.98(0.7) - .45
**   .41** - .17**   .   .63**   .36** - .25**   .31**   .20**   .23**   .30**   .12 - .02   .31**   .10 - .04   .33** 
Life Satisfaction (LS) 3.67(1.1) - .41
**   .16* - .21**   .63**   .   .38** - .25**   .07   .03   .14*   .19** - .07   .06   .08   .13 - .22**   .30** 
Positive Affect (PA) 3.07(1.4)/2.48(1.3) - .18
* - .01 - .01   .16*   .16*   . - .39**   .15*   .05   .13   .15* - .14 - .02   .16*   .33** - .31**   .73** 
Negative Affect (NA) 2.25(1.1)/2.12(1.1)   .13 - .15
*   .30** - .04   .07 - .22**   . - .02 - .10 - .26** - .13   .23** - .05 - .06 - .06   .23** - .55** 
1. Vividness 4.00(0.8)/3.38(0.9) - .13   .31
** - .09   .25**   .13   .17* - .01   .   .54**   .57**   .51**   .38**   .20**   .63**   .26**   .07   .14* 
2. Coherence 3.70(0.9)/3.78(0.8) - .13   .37
** - .22**   .22**   .04 - .13 - .16*   .53**   .   .45**   .42**   .25**   .13   .47**   .01 - .03   .13 
3. Accessibility 4.05(0.8)/3.88(0.9) - .22
**   .42** - .27**   .21**   .11   .08 - .26**   .50**   .54**   .   .43**   .26**   .24**   .51**   .21**   .01   .29** 
4. Sensory Details 3.59(0.8)/3.46(0.9) - .22
**   .38** - .17*   .32**   .11   .10 - .04   .62**   .39**   .40**   .   .45**   .13   .53**   .19**   .01   .16* 
5. Emotional Intensity 3.94(1.0)/3.40(1.0) - .09   .15
*   .02   .23**   .04   .15*   .24**   .37**   .14   .07   .54**   .   .04   .41**   .14*   .21** - .21** 
6. Visual Perspective 3.29(1.0)/3.10(0.9) - .02   .08 - .10   .02   .08 - .02 - .14   .06   .15
*   .20**   .03 - .16*   .   .13 - .04   .00 - .05 
7. Time Perspective 3.90(0.9)/3.34(1.1) - .19
**   .28** - .14   .27**   .14   .27**   .04   .64**   .28**   .30**   .60**   .52** - .04   .   .23**   .03   .20** 
8. Sharing 3.11(1.1)/2.73(1.1) - .13   .05 - .00   .07   .15
*   .31** - .08   .20**   .03   .19**   .10   .04 - .10   .21**   . - .19**   .30** 
9. Distancing 3.40(1.1)/3.28(1.1)   .19
** - .04   .11 - .08 - .15* - .28**   .31** - .02 - .03 - .15* - .07   .08 - .14*   .01 - .13   . - .33** 
10. Valence 3.28(1.5)/3.09(1.4) - .17
*   .05 - .16*   .07   .11   .62** - .53**   .12   .03   .27**   .05 - .06   .18*   .08   .21** - .45**   . 
(continue) 
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M (SD)   N   C   PHQ-9   FS   LS   PA   NA   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
40-49 years 
                   
Neuroticism (N) 2.67(0.8)   . - .46
**   .49** - .51** - .50** - .15*   .23** - .16* - .24** - .31** - .22** - .07 - .04 - .16* - .19**   .12 - .19** 
Conscientiousness (C) 3.96(0.7) - .46
**   . - .51**   .62**   .32**   .13 - .10   .34**   .26**   .32**   .44**   .17*   .02   .34**   .29** - .07   .20** 
Depression (PHQ-9) 5.65(6.3)   .49
** - .51**   . - .44** - .34** - .14*   .16* - .16* - .14* - .33** - .26** - .02 - .05 - .25** - .26**   .16* - .19** 
Positive Functioning (FS) 3.99(0.7) - .51
**   .62** - .44**   .   .65**   .28** - .12   .32**   .21**   .32**   .38**   .19**   .02   .35**   .35** - .15*   .28** 
Life Satisfaction (LS) 3.54(1.2) - .50
**   .32** - .34**   .65**   .   .28** - .18**   .13   .03   .22**   .15*   .06   .03   .14*   .24** - .13   .24** 
Positive Affect (PA) 3.23(1.3)/2.40(1.3) - .16
*   .16* - .13   .20**   .22**   . - .41**   .22**   .02   .38**   .33**   .06   .04   .21**   .37** - .30**   .64** 
Negative Affect (NA) 2.01(1.0)/2.06(1.1)   .13 - .08   .22
** - .06 - .09 - .44**   . - .01 - .05 - .29** - .07   .26** - .11 - .05 - .15*   .26** - .53** 
1. Vividness 4.20(0.8)/3.72(1.1) - .18
**   .34** - .05   .17* - .02   .20**   .12   .   .44**   .43**   .61**   .38**   .06   .60**   .31** - .03   .13 
2. Coherence 3.89(0.8)/3.81(0.8) - .17
*   .23** - .02   .14* - .01 - .05   .12   .42**   .   .29**   .30**   .21**   .13   .44**   .10 - .05   .10 
3. Accessibility 4.30(0.8)/4.06(0.8) - .28
**   .23** - .16*   .10   .04   .17* - .25**   .44**   .35**   .   .42**   .16*   .19**   .36**   .28** - .28**   .42** 
4. Sensory Details 3.76(0.8)/3.43(0.8) - .21
**   .36** - .14*   .25**   .10   .33**   .11   .65**   .28**   .26**   .   .41** - .01   .64**   .34** - .17*   .19** 
5. Emotional Intensity 4.01(0.9)/3.46(0.8) - .11   .24
** - .03   .18**   .05   .21**   .27**   .50**   .10   .12   .62**   . - .03   .36**   .15*   .04 - .12 
6. Visual Perspective 3.50(0.9)/3.20(1.1) - .20
**   .11 - .03 - .02   .05 - .08 - .13*   .14*   .19**   .19**   .10 - .04   .   .06   .03 - .01   .03 
7. Time Perspective 3.99(0.9)/3.29(0.9) - .19
**   .36** - .12   .22**   .06   .31**   .14*   .64**   .33**   .20**   .63**   .47**   .03   .   .36** - .16*   .21** 
8. Sharing 3.34(1.2)/2.60(1.1) - .01   .09 - .03   .09   .07   .35
** - .13   .23**   .09   .22**   .19**   .06   .07   .27**   . - .28**   .42** 
9. Distancing 3.13(1.2)/3.27(1.1) - .07   .04   .06   .02 - .11 - .25
**   .18**   .03 - .02 - .07 - .06 - .04 - .09   .01 - .22**   . - .35** 
10. Valence 3.68(1.4)/3.19(1.5) - .18
**   .14* - .23**   .11   .17*   .71** - .64**   .02 - .06   .24**   .10 - .11   .07   .04   .31** - .24**   . 
50-59 years 
                   
Neuroticism (N) 2.58(0.8)   . - .45
**   .58** - .49** - .46** - .23**   .26** - .05 - .15* - .13 - .08   .15*   .03 - .13 - .18**   .02 - .26** 
Conscientiousness (C) 4.10(0.6) - .45
**   . - .37**   .46**   .22**   .24** - .30**   .28**   .26**   .30**   .22**   .06   .08   .34**   .24** - .10   .22** 
Depression (PHQ-9) 4.33(5.5)   .58
** - .37**   . - .44** - .44** - .10   .34** - .06 - .28** - .11 - .04   .11   .02 - .08 - .12 - .04 - .29** 
Positive Functioning (FS) 4.08(0.6) - .49
**   .46** - .44**   .   .64**   .29** - .11   .22**   .21**   .24**   .30**   .17* - .06   .24**   .30** - .04   .20** 
Life Satisfaction (LS) 3.78(1.1) - .46
**   .22** - .44**   .64**   .   .15* - .05   .19**   .14*   .15*   .30**   .15* - .07   .10   .26** - .09   .15* 
Positive Affect (PA) 3.17(1.4)/2.47(1.3) - .18
**   .08 - .14*   .16*   .09   . - .39**   .18**   .10   .43**   .18**   .06 - .04   .27**   .41** - .33**   .68** 
Negative Affect (NA) 1.98(1.0)/2.11(1.1)   .20
** - .12   .30** - .15* - .16* - .42**   .   .02 - .00 - .30**   .09   .27** - .08 - .01 - .18**   .28** - .53** 
1. Vividness 4.18(0.8)/3.91(0.8) - .08   .25
** - .05   .16* - .01   .10   .06   .   .53**   .41**   .59**   .48**   .25**   .60**   .39** - .21**   .07 
2. Coherence 3.95(0.8)/3.95(0.8) - .14
*   .30** - .21**   .12 - .01 - .08 - .01   .58**   .   .35**   .31**   .28**   .19**   .47**   .14* - .04   .09 
3. Accessibility 4.22(0.8)/4.15(0.8) - .13   .29
** - .25**   .16*   .09   .19** - .31**   .43**   .51**   .   .28**   .10   .25**   .35**   .33** - .19**   .44** 
4. Sensory Details 3.75(0.8)/3.47(0.7) - .09   .29
** - .07   .16*   .04   .14*   .13   .56**   .34**   .36**   .   .52**   .05   .53**   .36** - .19**   .05 
5. Emotional Intensity 3.98(0.9)/3.40(1.1)   .14
*   .06   .14* - .00 - .09   .12   .30**   .43**   .12   .07   .51**   .   .08   .33**   .15* - .06 - .18** 
6. Visual Perspective 3.50(0.9)/3.37(0.9) - .04   .17
* - .08   .01 - .03 - .07 - .02   .21**   .35**   .34**   .11   .00   .   .13* - .05 - .09   .00 
7. Time Perspective 4.01(1.0)/3.54(1.1) - .15
*   .25** - .02   .16*   .00   .25** - .01   .61**   .31**   .29**   .56**   .41**   .09   .   .34** - .15*   .21** 
8. Sharing 3.15(1.2)/3.58(1.1) - .21
**   .14* - .07   .16*   .13   .26** - .07   .16*   .06   .14*   .21**   .01   .02   .29**   . - .31**   .35** 
9. Distancing 3.10(1.1)/3.18(1.1)   .05 - .03   .02   .03   .03 - .28
**   .17* - .18** - .20** - .27** - .17* - .13 - .16* - .14* - .14*   . - .33** 
10. Valence 3.67(1.4)/3.28(1.4) - .21
**   .04 - .19**   .05   .12   .66** - .65** - .03 - .04   .28**   .02 - .19**   .01   .11   .23** - .22** . 
(continue) 
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M(SD)     N   C   PHQ-9   FS   LS   PA   NA   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Over 60 years 
                   
Neuroticism (N) 2.37(0.8)   . - .49
**   .53** - .54** - .46** - .22**   .29** - .27** - .11 - .28** - .25** - .04 - .05 - .21** - .11   .00 - .24** 
Conscientiousness (C) 4.16(0.6) - .49
**   . - .45**   .58**   .44**   .13 - .18**   .25**    .33**   .39**   .26**   .14*   .12   .23**   .04 - .07   .13* 
Depression (PHQ-9) 3.27(4.5)   .53
** - .45**   . - .52** - .47** - .08 .18** - .27** - .12 - .24** - .24** - .07 - .06 - .15* - .08   .02 - .20** 
Positive Functioning (FS) 4.17(0.6) - .54
**   .58** - .52**   .   .65**   .22** - .25**   .25**   .21**   .26**   .23**   .14*   .10   .26**   .17*   .00   .24** 
Life Satisfaction (LS) 3.98(1.0) - .46
**   .44** - .47**   .65**   .   .18** - .24**   .14*   .06   .16*   .16*   .04 - .04   .12   .14* - .09   .16* 
Positive Affect (PA) 3.23(1.3)/2.51(1.2) - .11   .10 - .10   .13   .22
**   . - .55**   .14*   .02   .32**   .17*   .06   .00   .21**   .31** - .27**   .67** 
Negative Affect (NA) 1.94(1.0)/1.93(1.0)   .14
* - .07   .19** - .14* - .16* - .48**   .   .01   .09 - .33** - .03   .22** - .08 - .07 - .20**   .17* - .68** 
1. Vividness 4.32(0.7)/3.86(0.9) - .15
*   .28** - .19**   .23**   .13   .10 - .01   .   .48**   .46**   .65**   .50**   .16*   .71**   .28** - .19**   .11 
2. Coherence 4.00(0.8)/3.97(0.8) - .09   .16
* - .08   .23**   .07 - .06   .03   .55**   .   .39**   .34**   .29**   .26**   .48**   .08 - .19**   .01 
3. Accessibility 4.26(0.8)/4.07(0.8) - .13   .34
** - .09   .24**   .13   .22** - .23**   .53**   .39**   .   .36**   .11   .27**   .38**   .40** - .22**   .42** 
4. Sensory Details 3.71(0.8)/3.45(0.8) - .12   .19
** - .17*   .18*   .11   .20**   .03   .60**   .29**   .41**   .   .55**   .05   .63**   .23** - .35**   .20** 
5. Emotional Intensity 3.95(1.0)/3.39(1.1)   .03   .08 - .06   .07 - .00   .11   .27
**   .36**   .16*   .16*   .51**   .   .04   .40**   .17* - .17* - .05 
6. Visual Perspective 3.53(0.9)/3.28(0.8)   .01 - .02   .06   .02 - .13 - .06   .02   .13   .06   .05   .13   .09   .   .15
*   .18** - .13*   .09 
7. Time Perspective 4.11(0.9)/3.51(1.0) - .14   .22
** - .12   .20**   .16*   .16*   .02   .67**   .39**   .46**   .53**   .32**   .04   .   .27** - .27**   .13* 
8. Sharing 3.14(1.2)/2.40(1.1) - .13   .16
* - .16*   .19**   .19**   .31** - .25**   .25**   .10   .28**   .22**   .03   .05   .26**   . - .19**   .34** 
9. Distancing 3.08(1.3)/3.08(1.1)   .04 - .05   .12 - .14 - .22
** - .25**   .16* - .26** - .22** - .35** - .34** - .17* - .03 - .28** - .24**   . - .31** 
10. Valence 3.71(1.4)/3.49(1.4) - .07   .01 - .13   .05   .09   .62
** - .69**   .10 - .03   .27**   .15* - .08 - .05   .12   .32** - .31**   . 
Note. The sample comprised five age groups: 20-29 (N = 201), 30-39 (N = 199), 40-49 (N = 225), 50-59 (N = 229), and over 60 (N = 221). Correlations above the 
diagonal are for Turning Point Memory, whereas correlations below the diagonal are for Childhood Memory. Means and standard deviations on the left are for 
Turning Point and on the right for Childhood Memory. 
* p<.05. ** p<.01. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Supplementary Material of Study 2 
 
 
(a) Turning Point Memory 
 
 
(b) Childhood Memory 
 
 
Figure S1: Age at the time of event. Section (a) refers to 
Turning Point events (N = 99), section (b) refers to Childhood 
events (N = 94). 
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Table S1 – Intercorrelations among all variables at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 N C PHQ-9 FS LS PA NA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Age 
Time 1intercorrelations                   
  Neuroticism (N)   . - .34**   .50** - .39** - .50** - .22*   .23*   .04   .25* - .10   .09   .16 - .01   .11 - .29**   .11 - .25* - .07 
  Conscientiousness (C) - .34**   . - .42**   .37**   .37**   .36** - .34**   .22*   .00   .11   .13 - .11   .05   .15   .36** - .01   .32**   .11 
  Depression (PHQ-9)   .50** - .42**   . - .55** - .63** - .38**   .36** - .07   .15 - .10 - .04 - .03 - .26** - .18 - .49**   .06 - .34** - .21* 
  Positive Functioning (FS) - .39**   .37** - .55**   .   .76**   .39** - .36** - .01 - .09   .23*   .08 - .02   .03 - .07   .32**   .02    .40**   .12 
  Life Satisfaction (LS) - .49**   .37** - .63**   .76**   .   .40** - .41**   .05 - .09   .20*   .03 - .09   .13   .12   .34** - .05   .47**   .13 
  Positive Affect (PA) - .06   .14 - .09 - .01   .05   . - .42**   .17   .03   .33**   .33**   .22*   .14   .01   .42** - .27**   .73**   .27** 
  Negative Affect (NA) - .02   .10 - .04 - .07 - .07 - .28**   .   .00 - .02 - .20* - .02   .22* - .03 - .03 - .26**   .11 - .64** - .16 
  1. Vividness - .17   .30** - .18   .08   .08   .39**   .14   .   .51**   .39**   .51**   .37**   .25*   .55**   .35** - .20   .06   .20* 
  2. Coherence - .16   .21* - .16   .12   .03 - .03   .26*   .62**   .   .31**   .26**   .23*   .02   .40** - .08 - .24* - .03   .22* 
  3. Accessibility - .20   .08 - .12   .19   .14   .25* - .08   .45**   .34**   .   .21*   .11 - .02   .13   .24* - .16    .35**   .21* 
  4. Sensory Details - .08   .28** - .06   .09 - .02   .24*   .30**   .59**   .54**   .31**   .   .36**   .12   .37**   .18 - .20*   .09   .27** 
  5. Emotional Intensity   .19   .14 - .17 - .01   .04   .21*   .29**   .32**   .20   .17   .34**   .   .19   .25*   .02 - .05 - .08   .05 
  6. Visual Perspective - .27**   .18 - .15   .07   .10   .12 - .06   .29**   .37*   .25*   .14 - .11    .   .17   .25* - .09   .07   .14 
  7. Time Perspective - .19   .19 - .13   .02   .07   .24* - .00   .61**   .45**   .17   .33**   .05   .33**   .   .03 - .02 - .06   .18 
  8. Sharing - .06   .12 - .15   .19   .18   .26* - .29**   .19 - .06   .22* - .01 - .14   .16   .12   . - .08   .39**   .28** 
  9. Distancing   .01 - .11 - .01 - .07 - .01 - .19   .10 - .29** - .27** - .12 - .20* - .02 - .24* - .15 - .16   . - .18 - .20* 
  10. Valence - .14 - .01 - .14   .09   .18   .59** - .59**   .21* - .11   .30**   .05   .01   .11   .23*   .33** - .04   .   .16 
  Age at the event - .10   .04 - .14 - .04   .04 - .13   .05 - .09   .03 - .18 - .08 - .08   .01 - .01 - .18   .04 - .02   . 
Time 2 Intercorrelations                   
  Neuroticism (N)    . - .34**   .53** - .49** - .55** - .18   .33**   .14   .11 - .16   .09   .35** - .05   .18 - .42**   .25* - .27*   .10 
  Conscientiousness (C) - .34**   . - .41**   .36**   .33**   .27* - .41**   .08 - .06   .21   .13 - .29* - .07 - .19   .27* - .25*   .33** - .09 
  Depression (PHQ-9)   .53** - .41**   . - .61** - .56** - .28*   .38**   .01   .02   .00   .01   .22   .04   .11 - .27*   .28* - .35** - .11 
  Positive Functioning (FS) - .49**   .36** - .61**   .   .80**   .36** - .46** - .03 - .02   .02   .01 - .12 - .03 - .05   .19 - .28*   .29*   .13 
  Life Satisfaction (LS) - .55**   .33** - .56**   .80**   .   .25* - .35** - .13 - .09 - .16 - .11 - .25* - .09 - .16   .25 - .28*   .25*   .08 
  Positive Affect (PA) - .18   .10 - .16   .32*   .27*   . - .55** - .01 - .12   .28*   .23 - .05 - .32* - .01   .29* - .15   .67**   .20 
  Negative Affect (NA)   .05 - .18   .12 - .15   .00 - .31*    .   .22   .21 - .04   .10   .39**   .20   .12 - .24   .21 - .67** - .31* 
  1. Vividness - .25   .24 - .08   .14   .08   .34** - .01   .   .53**   .56**   .67**   .57**   .29*   .66**   .07 - .09 - .27* - .06 
  2. Coherence - .18   .12 - .21   .14   .09   .16 - .11  .53**   .   .22   .43**   .40**   .30*   .58** - .19 - .21 - .19 - .08 
  3. Accessibility - .22   .05 - .06   .08   .06   .02   .04  .55**  .49**   .   .42**   .28*   .19   .33**   .30*   .03   .08 - .04 
  4. Sensory Details - .14   .27* - .10   .12   .01   .35**   .08  .66**  .31*  .33**   .   .57**   .23   .59**   .12 - .13 - .04 - .03 
  5. Emotional Intensity   .11   .10 - .00   .03   .01   .46**   .15  .36**  .10  .04  .56**   .   .18   .42** - .07   .15 - .42** - .04 
  6. Visual Perspective - .16   .13 - .26*   .13   .08   .03 - .07  .49**  .56**  .43**  .34**   .19   .   .24 - .27* - .34** - .26* - .21 
  7. Time Perspective - .33*   .17 - .23   .20   .16   .13 - .11  .64**  .43**  .55**  .43**   .05  .39**   .   .01 - .06 - .23   .03 
  8. Sharing - .17   .08 - .00 - .05   .13   .25 - .19  .25  .09  .23  .06 - .04  .01   .16   . - .05   .25*   .21 
  9. Distancing   .20 - .03 - .03 - .05   .05 - .18   .23 -.35** -.33** -.20 -.35** - .27* -.38**  -.13 - .18   . - .20   .10 
  10. Valence - .24   .21 - .21   .34**   .37**   .63** - .58**  .13   .08  .08  .13   .13 -.03    .20   .41** - .23   .   .35** 
  Age at the event - .07 - .02 - .22   .14   .11    .01    .22 - .04    .02   .06   .07 - .01    .07  -.14  -.19 - .00 - .06   . 
Note. N = 99 had Turning Point and N = 94 had Childhood memory at Time 1; N = 64 had Turning Point and N = 61 had Childhood memory at 
Time 2. For each time point, Pearson’s correlations above the diagonal are for Turning Point and below for Childhood Memory. Personality 
was assessed only at Time 1 with the Big Five Inventory. PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire; FS = Flourishing Scale; LS = Life 
Satisfaction (1-item). * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table S2 – Intercorrelations among personality, depression and well-being variables at Time 1 and Time 2 
 N C T1 PHQ-9  T1 FS T1 LS  T2 PHQ-9  T2 FS  T2 LS  
Neuroticism (N)  1 - .34
**
   .50
**
 - .39
**
 - .50
**
   .53
**
 - .49
**
 - .55
**
 
Conscientiousness (C)    1 - .42
**
   .37
**
   .37
**
 - .41
**
   .36
**
   .33
**
 
T1 Depression (PHQ-9)      1 - .55
**
 - .63
**
   .81
**
 - .60
**
 - .60
**
 
T1 Positive Functioning (FS)       1   .76
**
 - .58
**
   .76
**
   .65
**
 
T1 Life Satisfaction (LS)        1 - .57
**
   .73
**
   .77
**
 
T2 Depression (PHQ-9)      ¤    1 - .61** - .56** 
T2 Positive Functioning (FS)          1   .80
**
 
T2 Life Satisfaction (LS)           1 
Note. N = 103 completed questionnaires at Time 1 and N = 72 at Time 2. Personality was assessed only at Time 1 with the Big 
Five Inventory. PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire; FS = Flourishing Scale; LS = Life Satisfaction (1-item); T1 = Time 1; 
T2 = Time 2. ** p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
